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 use suWe explore the relation between a country’s income and the mix of
products it exports. Both are simultaneously determined by countries’
capabilities, that is, by countries’ productivity and quality levels for
each good. Our theoretical setup has two features. (1) Some goods
have fewer high-quality producers/countries than others, meaning
that there is comparative advantage. (2) Imperfect competition allows
high- and low-quality producers to coexist. These two features gener-
ate an inverted-U, general equilibrium relationship between a country’s
export mix and its GDP per capita. We show that this inverted-U perme-
ates the international data on trade and GDP per capita.I. IntroductionA country’s capability—meaning the set of goods the country is able to
produce and its quality and productivity in producing them—drives its
per capita income and the sectoral mix of its exports. Aspects of the re-
lationship between quality, income, and the sectoral mix of exports have
been analyzed by a number of researchers. Hummels and Klenow (2005)thank Michelle Liu and especially Leilei Shen and Qi Zhang for excellent research
ance. We have benefited from seminar presentations at the Canadian Institute for Ad-
d Research, the London School of Economics, Princeton, Stanford, Toronto, and the
Bank and are grateful for comments from Daron Acemoglu, Philippe Aghion, Ber-
Blum, Avner Greif, Elhanan Helpman, David Hummels, Peter Morrow, and Bob
nically published May 6, 2016
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capabilities, wealth, and trade 827estimate the impact of a country’s per capita income and size on export
quality. Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) explore how the process
of “cost discovery” affects the sectoral mix of exports, which in turn af-
fects per capita incomes. Flam and Helpman (1987) and Fajgelbaum,
Grossman, and Helpman (2011) examine the codetermination of qual-
ity, income, and the sectoral mix of exports in a model in which demand-
side consumer heterogeneity plays a central role. In contrast, we use a
supply-side Ricardian model to show how the general equilibrium logic
of comparative advantage provides important theoretical and empirical
insights into how quality capabilities simultaneously affect per capita in-
comes and the sectoral mix of exports (as well as prices, markups, and
profits at the firm level).
To bring out these insights as clearly as possible, we focus theoretically
and empirically on characterizing the range of countries exporting a spe-
cific good, as in Schott (2004), and on characterizing how these coun-
tries’ market shares vary with their incomes. A standard intuition for the
relationship between market shares and incomes runs through quality.
Hummels and Klenow (2005) show that rich countries must have high-
quality exports because, at the aggregate level, rich countries have high
prices and high world market shares. A related inference appears in
Khandelwal (2010), Baldwin andHarrigan (2011), andHallak and Schott
(2011). We show both theoretically and empirically that this aggregate in-
sight does not carry over in general equilibrium to the sectoral level be-
cause of Ricardian comparative advantage. For example, the United States
is a high-quality producer of stainless steel, but this cannot be inferred
from US stainless steel’s high price and small world market share: the
United States simply cannot compete withmarkedly inferior Chinese stain-
less steel because US wages have been bid up by high demand for military
aircraft, virtualization software, and other hard-to-make goods and services
that only a handful of rich countries are capable of producing.
Our model has two key elements. (a) We make the Ricardian assump-
tion that products can be ordered by the scarcity of quality capabilities.
Specifically, if a country has high quality in good k, then it has high qual-
ity in all goods ranked below k. This means that low-k goods are ones
for which most countries have high quality and are in this sense “easy”
to make. In contrast, high-k goods are ones for which few countries
have high quality: they are “hard” to make. This assumption captures the
notion of relative (in a Ricardian sense) scarcity of quality capabilities.1Staiger. Trefler thanks CIFAR and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada for financial support.
1 For concreteness, let there be K goods, K countries, and two quality levels. We are as-
suming that goods and countries can be ranked such that good k is produced at low quality
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All(b) We assume that goods are differentiated only by quality (pure vertical
differentiation) and are supplied in markets characterized by Nash equi-
librium in quantities (Cournot competition). We use this assumption to
ensure that differing levels of quality will coexist in equilibrium. Elements
a and b generate a correlation between a country’s income and its export
mix. A country that can produce only a few goods at high quality will sur-
vive in only a few markets, and these will be the low-k or easy markets. As
a result, derived demand for the country’s labor will be low and wages will
be low. Thus, low-wage countries will export low-k goods. A country that
can produce many goods at high quality will have a high derived demand
for its labor and have high wages. High wages will make the country a
high-cost producer of low-k goods. Hence, a high-wage country will sur-
vive only in high-k markets.
This Ricardian sorting generates an inverted-U relationship between
income and market shares at the sectoral level. To understand why, con-
sider a country whose capabilities improve at the sectoral level: that is,
the country improves its quality in a k-ranked good until it reaches the
world quality frontier, and then it improves its quality in the next, higher-
ranked, good. During this quality improvement process, demand for the
country’s labor rises, as do its wages. As quality rises in good k, the country’s
worldmarket share of the good rises initially because quality must rise fas-
ter than wage costs. This “direct” or “quality” effect underpins the Hum-
mels and Klenow aggregate correlation. However, as quality then rises in
a higher-ranked good, wages continue to rise, thus killing off the coun-
try’s competitiveness in good k : even though the country is a high-quality
producer of good k, its world market share must decline as capabilities
rise in higher-ranked, tougher-to-make sectors. This familiar intersectoral,
general equilibrium feedback through the labor market is what we call
the Ricardian or wage effect. It is the reason for the downward-sloping sec-
tion of the inverted-U relationship between income andmarket share. The
model generates a large number of other theoretical predictions, which
we describe below, but our empirics are concentrated on this inverted-U
relationship.
Turning to our empirical work, we investigate the sectoral-level, in-
verted-U relationship between income and market shares using data for
94 countries in 2005. Data are from COMTRADE (four-digit Standard
International Trade Classification [SITC] and six-digit Harmonized Sys-
tem [HS]) and, to a lesser extent, the US imports file (10-digit HS). Theby firms in countries ranked 1, . . . , k2 1 and produced at high quality by firms in countries
ranked k, . . . , K. Then the number of countries that can produce good k at high quality is
decreasing in k; i.e., high-quality capabilities are scarce and this scarcity is relatively greater
for higher-ranked goods.
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capabilities, wealth, and trade 829theory states that the inverted-U relationship is driven by labor market
spillovers across sectors. We thus confine our attention to country-good
pairs for which the good is important in the country’s export basket and,
by implication, in the country’s labor market. For each good separately,
we build a “product range,” that is, a range of incomes defined by the
income levels of the poorest and richest exporters of the good. Product
ranges are related to Khandelwal’s (2010) quality ladders: the latter de-
scribes a range of qualities while the former describes a range of in-
comes. We will not be estimating quality and hence will have nothing
to say about quality ladders.2 Schott’s (2004) work on “overlap” leads
us to expect that product ranges will be large, and this is indeed what
we find. (The finding is not driven by China.) We then nonparamet-
rically estimate the relationship between income and world market
shares and show that it is exactly as predicted by the theory. (1) For those
products produced only by the richest countries, the relationship is pri-
marily positive: the direct or quality effect dominates. (2) For those prod-
ucts produced only by the poorest countries, the relationship is primarily
negative: the Ricardian or wage effect dominates. (3) For the remaining
“middle” products, the relationship is inverted-U, as first the quality effect
and then the wage effect kick in. Restated, Ricardian comparative advan-
tage based on relative scarcity of quality capabilities leads to general equi-
librium wage effects that are central for understanding the cross-country,
cross-sector relationship between quality, per capita income, and the sec-
toral mix of exports.
Changing subjects, we next turn to motivating our use of a nonstan-
dard trade model, that is, one without perfect competition or constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) monopolistic competition. Consider ta-
ble 1. We ranked all six-digit HS codes by the size of their world exports,
chose the top 10 codes, and identified the seven industries to which they
belong. For each of these seven industries we then used firm-level data
on worldwide production levels to compute four-firm concentration ra-
tios. The second column of table 1 shows that the seven industries are
typically highly concentrated at the global level. With the exception of
auto parts, just four firms in each industry produce between 21 percent
and 70 percent of global output. Thus these industries, which account
for a huge 21 percent of global exports, are typically dominated by a
small number of very large firms.
To account for global market dominance by a handful of firms we
need amodel with the following key feature: an infinite sea of low-quality
rivals cannot erode the market share of a high-quality incumbent. CES2 The fact that we are not estimating quality means that our agenda is very different from
that of Khandelwal (2010) and Hallak and Schott (2011).
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Alland other monopolistic competition models do not have this key feature
because love of variety ensures that an (infinite) inflow of new entrants
reduces (to zero) the market share of any incumbent firm. Thus, such
models cannot explain why global markets can be dominated by a hand-
ful of firms. In contrast, high concentration in global markets is readily
explained by appeal to the above-mentioned key feature that low quality
cannot drive out high. Further, the simplest and most analytically tracta-
ble model having this property is the Cournot model with quality.3
Our paper has four key elements: (1) multiple sectors that are ranked
on the basis of Ricardian scarcity of quality capabilities, (2) an imperfectly
competitive market structure that supports the coexistence of differ-
ing levels of quality, (3) endogenous income so that there can be general
equilibrium spillovers across sectors via the labor market (wages), and
(4) empirical work relating income to market shares at the sectoral level.
With this in mind, we relate our paper to the existing literature.
Our results are driven entirely by supply-side considerations. Demand
considerations play no role in our work. Allowing for demand-side het-
erogeneity and demand for quality that rises with income has yielded im-
portant insights for comparative advantage and per capita incomes (e.g.,
Flam andHelpman 1987; Hallak 2006, 2010; Choi, Hummels, and Xiang
2009; Fajgelbaum et al. 2011). However, the demand side by itself does3 See
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capabilities, wealth, and trade 831not provide a complete explanation of the cross-country relationship be-
tween per capita incomes, export baskets, and quality; one must also
look at supply-side capabilities (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1991).
The endogeneity of income allows us to bring issues of economic de-
velopment to the forefront of our research. The relationship between
per capita income and the mix of exports has been the subject of inves-
tigation at least since the discussion of ladders of development by
Chenery (1960) and more recently by Leamer (1984, 1987), Michaely
(1984), and Schott (2003). In these papers, as in ours, sectors are asym-
metric and ordered. For example, Schott orders sectors by labor intensity.
However, these papers do not consider quality, which is how we order sec-
tors. Lall, Weiss, and Zhang (2006), Hausmann et al. (2007), and Schott
(2008) provide policy-oriented discussions of the thesis that “what you
export matters.” We do not discuss policy in this paper. Implicitly, how-
ever, our work shifts the policy prescription away from getting the right
mix of exports and toward raising the quality of what is exported.
This paper builds on a series of papers by Sutton. In Sutton (1991,
1998, 2007a, 2007b), firms optimally invest in building quality capabili-
ties, and once these capabilities are developed, firms engage in Cournot
competition. This leads to a world in which the relative scarcity of capa-
bilities is an endogenous equilibrium outcome. We canmotivate this idea
of relatively scarce capabilities by reference to a key idea in the modern
“market structure” literature: if firms must incur fixed and sunk outlays
to develop their capabilities, then the number of firms that find it prof-
itable to develop these capabilities will be limited: the greater the elastic-
ity of quality (or productivity) responses to R&D or other fixed outlays,
the greater the degree to which firms “escalate” their R&D spending in
competing with rivals, and the smaller the number of producers that sur-
vive in the market. As a result, capabilities are scarce and scarcer in some
markets than in others: relative scarcity emerges endogenously. This ar-
gument holds for a broad class of models, of which the Cournot model
with quality is the simplest and most tractable example; it does not hold
for CES models with atomistic firms. For a concise review, see Sutton
(2007a). For a general equilibrium analysis of the mechanism of entry
and R&D competition leading to this, see Sutton (2007b). In this paper,
we simply take as given that some capabilities are relatively scarce.44 Sutton’s (1991, 1998, 2007a) work is related to the literature on the endogenous
choice of quality, e.g., Verhoogen (2008), Khandelwal (2010), and Kugler and Verhoogen
(2012). Models with exogenous quality include Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) and Johnson
(2012). On a separate note, Sutton (2007b) provides an international trademodel with two
countries that produce final goods and a third country that produces raw materials. He
shows that when there are raw materials that are internationally traded, quality and pro-
ductivity are not isomorphic and, in particular, that there is a minimum level of quality (in-
dependent of productivity or wages) that must be attained if a firm or country is to enter
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AllThe paper is structured as follows. Section II sets up the model, Sec-
tions III and IV present our two main results (goods are produced by
ranges of countries and market shares exhibit an inverted-U), and Sec-
tion V bridges from the theory to the empirics, which appear in Sections
VI–IX.II. Setup
A. Consumer ChoiceEach country has L identical workers. All workers in all countries have
identical Cobb-Douglas utility functions defined over goods indexed
by m,
U 5 ∏
m
ðumxmÞdm ; ð1Þ
where omdm 5 1, and um and xm denote the quality and quantity of good
m consumed. It follows from the form of the utility function that each
consumer spends fraction dm of income on good m. We assume that all
profits accrue to a separate group of individuals, who also have a utility
function of the form (1). From this it follows that total global expendi-
ture on good m, which we denote as Sm, is a fraction dm of world income.
Note that consumers choose both quantity xm and quality um. Looking
ahead, each firm is associated with a quality level, so choosing quality is
equivalent to choosing a firm. Consumers of good m will be indifferent
between any two firms that charge the same quality-adjusted price for m.
That is, there is pure vertical differentiation.B. Equilibrium in the Product MarketsWe characterize product market competition using the standard
“Cournot model with quality” introduced in Sutton (1991). In this model,
firms are characterized by a level of capability, consisting of a quality level
and a productivity parameter denoting the number of worker hours per
unit of output produced, together with a (“local”) wage rate specific to
the country in which the firm is located.5 At equilibrium, some subset of5 Thus all costs are labor costs, and fixed costs are sunk, and so do not enter the present
analysis. Materials costs, though of crucial importance in general, are here ignored in or-
der to keep the analysis as clear as possible. This issue is examined in depth by Sutton
(2007b), who shows that the key point is this: in the absence of material cost, low-wage
countries can become viable in world markets even at low quality once their wage costs
world export markets. Thus, there are limits on how much low wages can offset low quality.
Hallak and Sivadasan (2013) also break the quality-productivity isomorphism by postulat-
ing the existence of a minimum quality threshold needed for exporting. In our paper, by
contrast, quality and productivity are isomorphic.
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capabilities, wealth, and trade 833firms are active in the production of the good. At equilibrium, all active
firms offer the same quality-adjusted price. For each active firm, indexed
by i, its output level is related to the inverse of its productivity ci, its quality
ui, and its (local) wage rate wi. Solving for a Nash equilibrium in quanti-
ties, we obtain the firm’s quality-adjusted equilibrium price,
p
i
ui
5
1
Nm 2 1
o
j
wj cj
uj
; ð2Þ
and its quality-adjusted output level,
xiui 5
Nm 2 1
oj wj cj=uj
"
12 ðNm 2 1Þ wici=uioj wjcj=uj
#
Sm; ð3Þ
where Nm (≥ 2) denotes the total number of firms that are active in the
global market for good m and the sum oj is taken over all active firms.
See Appendix A for a derivation of equations (2) and (3). One can
see from equation (2) that pi/ui is the same for all active firms. It is useful
to plug equation (2) into equation (3) to obtain an alternative expres-
sion for output:
xi 5
1
p
i
 
12
wici
p
i
!
Sm ð30Þ
for pi > wici and xip 0 otherwise. Thus, a firm is active in equilibrium if
its price pi exceeds its marginal cost wici or, equivalently, if its quality-
adjusted price pi/ui exceeds its effective cost level wici/ui.
Note that the right-hand sides of equations (2) and (3) depend on ui
and ci only through the ratio ui/ci, which we refer to as the “capability” of
firm i. It follows that some key relationships between capabilities and
wages developed below will depend only on ui/ci and not on the absolute
levels of ui and ci. Since our empirical focus is on quality ui, without loss
of generality we set cip 1 for the remainder of the paper and periodically
remind the reader that our comments about quality are also germane to
productivity.are sufficiently low: only the ratio of unit costs (wages times labor input) to quality matters
to viability, and shortcomings in quality can be offset by a low value of the wage. But once
material inputs as well as labor are required, a fall in the wage can reduce only unit costs to
the world market value of the material input. This places a floor on price and so establishes
a corresponding minimum quality level, independent of local wages, that is required for
viability. Deficiencies in productivity can always be compensated for by low wages, but de-
ficiencies in quality cannot. This is an important reason for emphasizing the role of quality
in our present discussion.
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AllC. The Scarcity of Quality CapabilitiesAssume for the moment that there are mp 1,…, K goods and kp 1,…,
K types of countries. Equal numbers of goods and country types are a
prelude to assortive matching between goods and country types. A type
k country is a country whose firms can produce goods 1 to k but cannot
produce goods k 1 1 to K. The interpretation is that goods with higher
indexes require capabilities that are scarcer. Higher-indexed goods are
“harder” to make.
Following up on our introductory comments on the scarcity of capa-
bilities, we assume that each type k country is endowed with a finite num-
ber of firms. For simplicity alone, we assume that each type k country has
exactly one firm. This firm can potentially produce up to k products, that
is, products 1, …, k.6 Let Nk ≥ 2 be the number of type k countries. Since
country types 1,…, k2 1 cannot produce good k, there areok 0≥kN k 0 firms
that can potentially produce good k. Importantly, this sum is decreasing
in k. How many firms actually produce in equilibrium is endogenous. As
in Chaney (2008), we distinguish between potential firms and firms that
are active. It is the potential number of firms that is fixed.
We next generalize this setup slightly by assuming that there are K
groups of goods, each with H identical goods. Each good m is now in-
dexed by the pair (h, k), and there is a total of HK goods; see figure 1.
Now the above setup applies to each good in this expanded set of goods.
Specifically, good (h, k) is potentially produced by one firm from each
country of type k 0 ≥ k, and, as before, there are ok 0≥kN k 0 potential firms
per good.
Conditional on being able to produce a good, firms differ in the qual-
ity of their goods. We begin with a very simple assumption: all firms that
are able to produce a good produce it to common quality u. There is no
need to let u vary across goods because quality comparisons are never
made across goods. Quality comparisons are, however, made across the
many producers of a single good: these quality differences are introduced
below, where they play a central role.7D. EquilibriumThe above assumptions imply that there is symmetry across all countries
within a country type. We therefore index only country types (kp 1,…,6 Recall that marginal costs are constant so that the firm’s profit function is the additively
separable sum of k profit functions. Thus, whether we think of there being k firms each po-
tentially producing one good or one firm potentially producing up to k goods is a matter of
notation. We choose the latter.
7 See our key propositions 3–5. Our remaining propositions (propositions 1 and 2) also
generalize to the case in which there are quality differences across producers. These gen-
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capabilities, wealth, and trade 835K ) and speak of a representative type k country. We add one last assump-
tion—preferences are symmetric across all goods within a group of
goods—so that there is also symmetry across all goods within a group
of goods. There is thus no need for the complicated mp (h, k) notation,
which we replace with the following simpler notation. We let g denote a
representative good in group gp 1,…, K and use the phrase “a group g
good” to indicate a representative good from group g. Thus, for exam-
ple, Sg denotes the share of world expenditure spent on a representative
good in group g and SgH is the share of world expenditure spent on allH
goods in group g. With this setup, the variables in equations (2) and (3)
become uip u, cip 1, Smp Sg, pip pg (the common price faced by all
producers of group g goods), wip wk (the wage in type k countries), and
xip xgk (the output of a representative group g good produced by a type
k country).
Product market equilibrium.—The price that equates firm supplies with
consumer demands is given by equation (2). Substituting our new nota-
tion into equation (2) yields the equilibrium price of a representative
group g good:
p
g
5
1
okN k 2 1ok
N kwk; ð4Þ
where the sum ok is over the set of country types that produce g in equi-
librium.8
Labor market equilibrium.—Substituting our new notation into equation
(30), the profit-maximizing supply of a group g good by a firm in a type k
country is
xgk 5
1
p
g
 
12
wk
p
g
!
Sg ð5ÞFIG. 1.—Types of countries and groups of goods8 That is, over the set Kg ; fk :   pg > wk  and  k ≥ gg. Also, note that we are assuming
throughout that there are no trade costs. With trade costs, eq. (4) must be modified.
eralizations appear as propositions 6 and 7 in App. E. They are relegated to an appendix
because they are not essential for the empirics.
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Allfor pg > wk and xgk p 0 otherwise. Since one unit of labor is needed to
produce one unit of output and there are H goods in each group of
goods, Hog xgk is the demand for labor in a type k country. Each type k
country is endowed with L workers and each worker supplies one unit
of labor so that L is the supply of labor. Hence the labor market-clearing
condition in each type k country is
L 5Ho
g
xgk  : ð6Þ
Balanced trade.—To develop an expression for net exports of a type k
country, note that sales of a typical group g good are p
g
xgk , total sales
of all goods within group g are Hp
g
xgk , national income is Hog pg xgk ,
and GDP per worker is y
k
; Hog pg xgk=L. For a typical group g good
produced by a type k country, output is xgk and the value of consumption
is dgHog 0pg 0xg 0k so that net exports are xgk 2 ðdgHog 0pg 0xg 0kÞ=pg . By
Walras’s law, product and labor market clearing together imply balanced
trade.
An equilibrium is a set of product prices fp
g
gK
g51
and a set of wages
fwkgKk51 such that when consumers maximize utility and producers max-
imize profits, product markets clear internationally (eq. [4]), labor mar-
kets clear nationally (eq. [6]), and trade is balanced. The proof that an
equilibrium exists is standard and appears in online Appendix F.III. Characterizing Equilibrium, Part 1:
Product RangesOur analysis, and the empirical evidence presented later, focus on two
equilibrium outcomes. First, higher-ranked country types will be richer.
That is, both wages wk and GDP per capita yk are strictly increasing in k.
Second, group g goods are produced by and only by the range of country
types g, g1 1,…, kg (kg is an endogenous integer, the highest-ranked pro-
ducer of g). Countries ranked above kg have wages that are too high to
profitably produce g and countries ranked below g are not capable of
producing g. Only countries g,…, kg produce g. Thus, each group of
goods is produced by an interval of country types running from the poor-
est (yg) to the richest (ykg ). In this section, we develop a proposition that
characterizes these “product range” intervals.
Proposition 1 (Product ranges).
1. A group g good is produced by a type k country if and only if kp
g , … , kg for some country type kg that is increasing in g. That is,
each good is produced by an interval of country types and both
boundaries of the interval are increasing in g.This content downloaded from 158.143.129.136 on October 24, 2018 02:07:43 AM
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capabilities, wealth, and trade 8372. Wages wk and GDP yk are strictly increasing in k and pg is strictly in-
creasing in g. That is, countries with scarce capabilities have high
wages and high GDP per worker while goods for which capabilities
are scarce have high prices.
3. A type k country produces and produces only goods in groups gp
gk ,…, k for some gk ≤ k that is increasing in k. That is, each country
produces an interval of goods whose boundaries are increasing
in k.The proof appears in Appendix B. We note that it is parts 1 and 2 of
this proposition that are central to our empirical development below. We
describe the equilibria in proposition 1 as “product range” equilibria be-
cause each group g good is produced by a set of country types with a
range of GDP per capita.9
Remarks.—First, there are two features of the model that are not ame-
nable to empirical work. (a) The number of producers of any group g
good is N g 1 N g11 1 ⋯1 N kg . This will not in general be decreasing in
g because kg is increasing in g. Thus, harder-to-make goods need not have
fewer producers. It is easy to construct equilibria in which the number of
producers is nonmonotonic or even increasing in g. We will thus have
nothing to say empirically about the number of producers. (b) Prop-
osition 1 places no restrictions on the length of product range intervals
[g , kg] because both boundaries are increasing in g. Further, kg is deter-
mined as part of a general equilibrium solution that is necessarily com-
plex. We will thus have nothing to say empirically about the length of
product ranges.
Second, proposition 1 does not rely on any assumptions about the size
of markets for each group of goods, that is, on the Cobb-Douglas param-
eters dg or, equivalently, on the Sg. Further, proposition 1 holds for CES
preferences.10
Third, we have assumed that quality (u) and labor forces (L) are the
same for all countries. If we allow u and L to vary across countries, it is9 Schott (2004) pioneered research on product ranges. Proposition 1 deepens his anal-
ysis in that income is endogenous and there are multiple sectors, with the result that there
are cross-sector spillovers via general equilibrium wage effects. It is these spillovers that de-
termine the size of product ranges (i.e., the size of the kg) or, in Schott’s terminology, the
degree of “product overlap.”
10 Assume that utility is given by U 5 ðomxmrÞ1=r (Cobb-Douglas is r p 0). Then the
eq. (5) expression for xgk becomes
xgk 5
12 r
ðp
g
Þ12r
 
12
wk
p
g
!
Sg :
This does not result in any changes to proposition 1. Further, it leads to only minor changes
in proposition 2 below. Specifically, in proposition 2 the term N k=ðN k 2 1Þ is replaced by
N k=ðN k 2 11 rÞ and the term N k=Sk is replaced by N 12rk =Sk . Cobb-Douglas is used in prop-
ositions 3–5 below in order to derive closed-form solutions for all variables.
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Allpossible to construct examples in which the product range property of
part 1 of proposition 1 fails. The simplest counterexample relates to het-
erogeneity in country sizes. Suppose there are three country types and
three groups of goods. Countries of types 1 and 3 are very large while
countries of type 2 are very small. Countries of type 1 can produce only
group 1 goods. Countries of type 2 produce group 2 goods, demand for
which absorbs all of their small labor force, so they do not produce
group 1 goods. Countries of type 3, with their large labor force, produce
all three groups of goods. In short, group 1 goods are produced by coun-
try types 1 and 3 but not 2, thus violating the product range property.11
Finally, in Appendix E we extend proposition 1 (and proposition 2 be-
low) to the case in which qualities differ by country type (uk). There we
assume that uk ≥ uk21 and show that propositions 1 and 2 continue to
hold; in addition, there will also be an equilibrium range of qualities
and prices for each good. Such quality differences will be introduced ex-
plicitly in the next section, where they play a central role for our core
testable propositions 3–5.IV. Characterizing Equilibrium, Part 2:
The Inverted-U RelationshipHaving identified product ranges, we now introduce cross-country differ-
ences in quality capabilities and show that product ranges are character-
ized by an inverted-U relationship between market shares and income.
We do so in two steps. First, we initially abstract from quality differences
and describe a benchmark perfect-sorting equilibrium in which group k
goods are produced by and only by type k countries. Second, we then al-
low one type k “developing” country to improve its quality capabilities,
first for group k goods and then for group (k 1 1) goods. The increase
in group k quality increases the developing country’s wage and its group
k exports. This is the upward-sloping portion of the inverted-U. The sub-
sequent increase in group (k 1 1) quality increases the developing coun-
try’s wage and thus reduces its group k exports. This is the downward-
sloping portion of the inverted-U. The next theorem describes the first-step
perfect-sorting equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Perfect-sorting equilibria).
1. An equilibrium displays perfect sorting if and only if
ðPSCÞ Nk21
Sk21
≥
 
Nk
Nk 2 1
!
Nk
Sk
 for k 5 2; : : : ;K  :11 We will return to the consequences of country size heterogeneity in the empirical
Sec. VIII below.
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capabilities, wealth, and trade 8392. If the perfect-sorting condition (PSC) holds, then there is a
unique equilibrium set of product prices and wages given by
p
k
5
HSk
LN k
 and wk 5
N k 2 1
N k
HSk
LN k
  8k  : ð7Þ
Further, the markup is Nk=ðNk 2 1Þ, GDP per worker is yk 5
ðHSkÞ=ðLN kÞ, total profits are Hpkk 5 HSk=N 2k , output is xkk 5
L=H , and net exports of a group g good are ð12 dgH ÞL=H if
the good is exported and 2dgL if the good is imported.Note that from proposition 1, pk, wk, and yk are strictly increasing in k.
The proof appears in Appendix C.12
It may help in interpreting the PSC to note that when the Sk are the
same across countries, then the PSC is equivalent to Nk21 ≥ Nk 1 2. See
Appendix D for a proof. This says that as wemove to higher-ranked prod-
ucts, the number of firms capable of producing these products is smaller.
In what follows we set all Skp S in order to simplify notation and assume
that we are starting from a perfect-sorting equilibrium.
Against this background of perfect sorting, we take one type (k 2 1)
country and allow it to produce goods in group k at a quality level vk,
which rises over time from zero to u. We will refer to this country as
the “developing” country. As vk rises, the developing country’s mix of
output will gradually shift from the production of group (k 2 1) goods
to group k goods. This change will, in general, affect the equilibrium
wage rate of all countries of adjacent types and the total income (and ex-
penditure) in each country and market. For a typical type k country, let
wk be its wage, let pk be its price, let xk be its quantity, and let u be its qual-
ity. Let wk21, pk21, xk21, and u be the corresponding variables for a typical
type (k 2 1) country. For the developing country, which may be produc-
ing both group (k 2 1) and group k goods, let w be its wage, let pk21 and
pk be its prices, let xk21 and xk be its quantities, let u be its quality in group
(k 2 1) goods, and let vk be its quality in group k goods.
Income or GDP per worker for our three types of countries is
y
k215Hpk21xk21=L;
y
k
5 Hp
k
xk=L  ;
y 5 H ðp
k21
xk21 1 pkxkÞ=L;
  ð8Þ12 Part 2 of the proposition is trivial to prove because in a perfect-sorting equilibrium,
eqq. (4) and (6) become p
k
5 wkNk=ðNk 2 1Þ and L 5 Hxkk 5 H ð1=pkÞð12 wk=pkÞSk ,
which is trivially solved for pk and wk. Themarkup pk/wk follows from eq. (7); xkk follows from
Lp Hxkk; and yk follows from yk 5 Hpkxkk=L. Profits are pkk 5 ðpk 2 wkÞxkk and total profits
are Hpkk. At the end of Sec. II.D, we showed that net exports are xkk 2 ðdkHpkxkkÞ=pk , which
simplifies to ð12 dkH Þxkk .
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Allthat is, revenue per good times the number of goods (H) divided by the
workforce (L).
Consider the situation in which vk has risen to the point where the de-
veloping country is producing both groups of goods. All producers of a
good charge the same quality-adjusted price so that
p
k21
u
5
p
k21
u
; ð9Þ
p
k
vk
5
p
k
u
 : ð10Þ
For each group (k 2 1) good there are Nk21 2 1 typical producers with
wage wk21 and the one developing country producer with wage w. Hence
multiplying equation (2) through by the common u,
p
k21
5
1
Nk21 2 1
½ðNk21 2 1Þwk21 1 w : ð11Þ
The developing country’s presence in both the k 2 1 and k industries
means that it now has 2H firms, the original H firms producing each of
the group (k 2 1) goods and the H new firms producing each of the
group k goods.13 The total number of firms producing each type k good
is therefore Nk1 1: Nk firms have wage wk and quality u while the one de-
veloping country firm has wage w and quality vk. Hence,
p
k
u
5
1
Nk
 
Nk
wk
u
1
w
vk
!
 : ð12Þ
To determine prices and wages, we need simply look at the labormarket-
clearing conditions. Recalling that labor supply is given by L and that la-
bor demand is given by total output, labor market clearing for a typical
type (k2 1) country is L 5 Hxk21. Plugging the equation (30) expression
for xk21 into L 5 Hxk21 yields
L 5 H
1
p
k21
 
12
wk21
p
k21
!
S  ; ð13Þ
where we have used the fact that every firm in a typical type (k2 1) coun-
try charges price p
k21
and has wage wk21.13 An alternative interpretation is as follows: the group k good is produced by the same
firm that produces the corresponding group (k2 1) good. Each firm now has two indepen-
dent businesses, making k and k 2 1. Given Cobb-Douglas preferences, constant marginal
costs, and the fact that the firm takes S as given, it follows that the firm’s profit function is
additively separable in its activities in the k 2 1 and k markets so that the firm sets the
Cournot output in each of these markets. (Since there are no fixed costs, a firm will be ac-
tive in any market where its quality supports a price that exceeds its marginal cost of pro-
duction.)
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capabilities, wealth, and trade 841For a typical type k country, labor market clearing is likewise given by
L 5 H
1
p
k
 
12
wk
p
k
!
S  : ð14Þ
For the developing country, labor market clearing is L 5 Hxk21 1Hxk
or
L 5 H
1
p
k21
 
12
w
p
k21
!
S 1H
1
p
k
 
12
w
p
k
!
S  : ð15Þ
Equations (9)–(15) are seven equations in the four prices and three
wages. It is very easy to solve explicitly for these seven variables in terms
of a numeraire, and this is done in Appendix F, Section A, where the
numeraire is expenditures per good S. This establishes that for vk in
the range where the developing country produces both groups of goods,
there is a unique equilibrium, and in this equilibrium there are closed-
form expressions for all the equilibrium prices. Since our focus is com-
parative statics with vk, we write all equilibrium outcomes as functions of
vk, for example, w(vk), pk(vk), xk(vk), and S(vk).
We now explore the effect of raising the exogenous variable vk from
the critical value at which xk(vk) becomes positive, past the critical value
at which xk21(vk) becomes zero, and through to the value vkp u at which
the developing country becomes identical to a type k country. At the
point where vk p u, we are back in a world of perfect sorting, but with
Nk21 and Nk replaced by Nk212 1 and Nk1 1, respectively. To ensure this,
for the remainder of the paper we assume that the PSC holds with these
substitutions.14
Lemma 1. There are constants vLk and v
H
k with 0 < v
L
k < v
H
k < u such
that
vLk < vk < v
H
k ⇔ xk21ðvkÞ > 0  and  xkðvkÞ > 0;
vHk < vk < u⇔ xk21ðvkÞ 5 0  and  xkðvkÞ > 0:
We refer to the situation in which the developing country is producing
both xk21(vk) and xk(vk) as phase I. We refer to the situation in which the
developing country is producing only xk(vk) as phase II. A third phase,
where the developing country has gained the capability of producing
goods in group k 1 1, will be described later. These three phases appear
at the top of figure 2. Note that when vk < vLk , the developing country’s14 Specifically,
Nk21 2 1 ≥
 
Nk 1 1
Nk 1 12 1
!
ðNk 1 1Þ 5 ðNk 1 1Þ2=Nk :
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Allquality is so low that it specializes in group (k 2 1) goods; that is, we are
in the perfect sorting case of the previous section.A. Phase IWe begin by characterizing the equilibrium properties of phase I. These
are illustrated in figure 2 and stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Phase I). Consider vk ∈ðvLk ;  vHk Þ so that xk21ðvkÞ > 0
and xkðvkÞ > 0. Then as vk rises from vLk to vHk :
1. xk21ðvkÞ falls to zero and xk(vk) rises from zero; that is, the develop-
ing country reduces output of group (k 2 1) goods and increases
output of group k goods;
2. p
k21
ðvkÞ=wðvkÞ falls and pkðvkÞ=wðvkÞ rises; that is, markups charged
by developing country firms fall for group (k 2 1) goods and rise
for group k goods;
3. wðvkÞ=SðvkÞ rises; that is, the wage in the developing country rises
relative to the numeraire; and
4. yðvkÞ=SðvkÞ rises; that is, GDP per worker in the developing coun-
try rises relative to the numeraire.The core phase I insight is that as the developing country’s quality ca-
pabilities improve in group k goods, the developing country experiences
rising demand for its output and labor and hence rising wages. This cre-
ates two effects: (1) Improved quality improves the country’s competi-
tiveness in group k goods. This is the direct or “quality” effect. (2) Higher
wages reduce the country’s competitiveness in group (k2 1) goods. This
is the general equilibrium Ricardian or “wage” effect.
While not used for our empirics, we note that there are cross-country
general equilibrium impacts. For example, as China improves its quality
capabilities in autos, we would expect that clothing manufacturers in
Bangladesh would be better off and auto manufacturers in the United
States would be worse off. The next proposition makes this point.
Proposition 4 (Phase I). As vk rises from vLk to v
H
k , (1) wk21ðvkÞ=SðvkÞ
rises and wkðvkÞ=SðvkÞ falls; that is, relative to the numeraire, the wage
rises in type (k 2 1) countries and falls in type k countries; and (2)
wðvkÞ=wk21ðvkÞ rises; that is, the wage rises faster in the developing coun-
try than in type (k 2 1) countries.B. Phase IIWhen quality capabilities rise above vHk , our developing country’s wage
becomes so high that its firms are no longer viable (profitable) in theThis content downloaded from 158.143.129.136 on October 24, 2018 02:07:43 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
FIG. 2.—Advancing quality. The top panel shows the developing country’s quality in
group k goods advancing from vkp 0 to vkp u, and then its quality in group (k1 1) goods
advancing from vk11p 0 to vk11p u. The critical value of vk at which production of group k
goods becomes viable is labeled vLk and is marked by the left-most dashed vertical line. The
critical value of vk at which production of group (k2 1) goods becomes unviable is labeled
vHk and is marked by the dashed vertical line separating phases I and II. The second and
third panels show how equilibrium income (wages and GDP per worker) and the markup
rise as qualities rise. The bottom two panels show how the output of goods in groups k2 1,
k, and k 1 1 change.This content downloaded from 158.143.129.136 on October 24, 2018 02:07:43 AM
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Allmarkets for group (k 2 1) goods. Equations (10)–(15) continue to hold
with only two modifications. The labor market equilibrium condition for
the developing country, equation (15), now becomes
L 5 Hxk 5 H
1
p
k
 
12
w
p
k
!
S  : ð15‐IIÞ
Also, the price of group (k2 1) goods, equation (11), must be modified
because there are now only Nk21 2 1 producers, all with wage wk21 and
quality u. Hence, from equation (2) with Ng 5 Nk21 2 1,
p
k21
5
Nk21 2 1
Nk21 2 2
wk21 : ð11‐IIÞ
Equations (10), (11-II), (12), (13), (14), and (15-II) are six equations in
the three prices and three wages. It is very easy to solve explicitly for
these six variables in terms of the numeraire S, and this is done in Appen-
dix F, Section B. This establishes existence and uniqueness and provides
a complete characterization of equilibrium in phase II.
The impact of vk rising to u appears in figure 2 as the early part of
phase II (where vk11 is still zero) and is stated in the next proposition.
Proposition 5 (Early phase II). Consider vk ∈ ðvHk ;  uÞ so that xk21ðvkÞ 5
0 and xkðvkÞ > 0. Then as vk rises from vHk to u:
1. p
k
ðvkÞ=wðvkÞ rises; that is, themarkup charged by developing coun-
try firms rises;
2. wðvkÞ=SðvkÞ rises; that is, the wage in the developing country rises
relative to the numeraire; and
3. yðvkÞ=SðvkÞ rises; that is, GDP per worker in the developing coun-
try rises relative to the numeraire.C. Phase IIIWenow allow the developing country’s quality capabilities in group (k1 1)
goods, which we denote by vk11, to rise from zero to u (fig. 2, top panel). All
of our lemma 1 and proposition 3 results relating changes in vk to changes
in variables subscripted by k 2 1 and k now apply when relating changes
in vk11 to changes in variables subscripted by k and k 1 1, respectively. In
particular, there is a critical value vLk11 at which the developing country
begins producing goods in group k 1 1 and a critical value vHk11 at which
the developing country stops producing goods in group k. During this
process markups rise for group (k 1 1) goods (the direct or quality ef-
fect). Further, wages and GDP per worker rise relative to the numeraire,
and this reduces the markups for group k goods (the Ricardian or wage
effect); see figure 2.This content downloaded from 158.143.129.136 on October 24, 2018 02:07:43 AM
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capabilities, wealth, and trade 845V. Toward Empirics: Implications for ExportsTo examine these predictions empirically, we will use international data
and therefore need expressions for exports. We start by noting that, in
equilibrium, all producers charge the same quality-adjusted price so that
consumers do not care which producer they buy from. We therefore as-
sume that in equilibrium there is no cross-hauling of goods across inter-
national borders; that is, a good is either imported or exported, but not
both.
Let X k21ðvkÞ and X kðvkÞ be the value of exports for typical countries of
type k 2 1 and k, respectively. Note that a lowercase x is the quantity of
output and an uppercase X is the value of exports. Also note that these
are values (price times quantity) since that is what we observe in the data.
The developing country’s value of exports for a good in group k2 1 and
a good in group k is denoted by X k21ðvkÞ and X kðvkÞ, respectively.15 The
next lemma states that exports behave like production.
Lemma 2 (Exports).
1. As vk rises in phase I, Xk21ðvkÞ=SðvkÞ and Xk21ðvkÞ=X k21ðvkÞ fall to
zero.
2. As vk rises in phases I and II, X kðvkÞ=SðvkÞ and X kðvkÞ=X kðvkÞ rise
from zero.In our empirics we will examine the value of exports of group (k 2 1)
and group k goods as a share of world exports. For the developing coun-
try these shares are given by
vXk21ðvkÞ ;
X k21ðvkÞ
X k21ðvkÞ1 ðN k21 2 1ÞX k21ðvkÞ
;
vXk ðvkÞ ;
X kðvkÞ
X kðvkÞ1 N kX kðvkÞ
;
  ð16Þ
vXk11 is the same as v
X
k but with the k index incremented by 1.
The evolution of these world export shares follows immediately from
lemma 2. In phase I, the developing country is shifting out of group (k2
1) production and into group k production. This benefits type (k 2 1)
countries and hurts type k countries so that vXk21 falls and v
X
k rises. In
phase II, the developing country is specialized in group k production
and getting better at it, which hurts type k countries. Thus, vXk rises.15 Typical type (k2 1) countries produce and export a single good so that gross and net
exports are equal. For some values of vk, the developing country produces two goods, and
one of these is produced in such small amounts that the good is imported. Thus, for the
developing country, exports are gross rather than net.
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AllWe now make the transition from theory to empirics. We do not ob-
serve capabilities, but changes in capabilities induce observable changes
in GDP per worker and the value of exports. These are illustrated in
figure 3, which plots export shares against GDP per worker for the devel-
oping country. In phase I, y(vk) increases, v
X
k21ðvkÞ falls to zero, and vXk ðvkÞ
rises from zero. Note that vXk ðvkÞ does not start rising as soon as phase I is
entered because at this point production of group k goods is so small
that these goods are still imported. The point at which exporting of
group k goods starts is indicated in figure 3 by ymin,k. This ymin,k is very im-
portant for our empirics.
In the first part of phase II, where vk is rising to u, both y(vk) and v
X
k ðvkÞ
rise. In the second part of phase II, where capabilities in k 1 1 are rising
but have not yet reached a level at which the developing country can en-
ter group (k 1 1) markets, nothing happens; see figure 2. It follows that
the system is “stuck” at the point where yp y(u).
In phase III, the developing country enters group (k1 1) markets and
grabs world market share; that is, vXk11 rises. This drives up wages and
makes the developing country less competitive in group k markets. As
a result vXk ðvkÞ falls. As the process continues, the developing country
reaches the point where it consumes the small amount of xk that it is still
producing, that is, vXk ðvkÞ 5 0. By definition, phase III ends when xkp 0,
so vXk ðvkÞ goes to zero just before the end of the phase. This is indicatedFIG. 3.—Empirics: Quality and the income-export nexus. The figure illustrates two of
the central empirical predictions of the model. First, a single good can be produced both
by low-wage, low-quality countries and by high-wage, high-quality countries. The points ymin,k
and ymax,k are the GDP per worker of the poorest and richest countries producing a group
k good. Second, world market shares will be an inverted-U-shaped function of GDP per
worker.This content downloaded from 158.143.129.136 on October 24, 2018 02:07:43 AM
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capabilities, wealth, and trade 847on figure 3 by the point ymax,k, which is also important for our empirics. It
is straightforward to calculate closed-form solutions for ymin,k and ymax,k.16
Two key empirical points emerge from figure 3. First, poorer, low-
quality countries can produce the same good as richer, higher-quality
countries. Low-quality countries compete because in equilibrium they
have low wages. This implies that there are “product ranges,” that is,
ranges of GDP per worker compatible with viability in the market. In fig-
ure 3, the product range for group k goods is ðymin;k;  ymax;kÞ. Second,
whereas in a single-sector model, world market shares increase with qual-
ity, in a multisector world there are Ricardian forces that lead to inverted-
U-shaped world market shares. As quality rises, wages rise, and this leads
to a loss of competitiveness in low-k goods. As a result, export shares even-
tually “turn down.” These are the two main empirical predictions that we
will examine. A third prediction, that prices rise with quality and hence
with income, is an important implication of the model; however, we ex-
plore it empirically only in Appendix H because it has been examined
elsewhere (e.g., in Schott 2004).17
We can restate this in a way that makes one of the key points of our
thesis crystal clear. A poor country can advance out of low-ranked goods
and still remain poor: this happens when the country enters as a low-
quality producer into goods with wide product ranges. Since, as we shall16 There are two minor points in the figure that are not used in what follows. (1) At the
start of phase I, all countries are identical so that each of the type (k 2 1) countries has a
world market share of vXk21 5 1=Nk21. At the end of phase II, all countries are again identical
so that each type k country has a world market share of vXk 5 1=ðNk 1 1Þ. At the end of
phase III, it is vXk11 5 1=ðNk11 1 1Þ. (2) Production always goes to zero at the end of a phase.
Since gross exports go to zero before production does (i.e., at the point where all domestic
production is consumed domestically), gross exports always go to zero before the end of a
phase. Likewise, at the start of a phase, production starts and is consumed domestically so
that exporting starts just after the start of a phase.
17 Additionally, we note that our model, which has endogenous wages, delivers a clear
statement about how prices rise both because of quality improvements and because of ris-
ing marginal costs (wages). Many models of international trade and quality treat wages as
exogenous and so cannot give such a clear statement. On a separate note, some readers will
have noticed that the output-quality or output-income relationship in fig. 3 looks like the
Heckscher-Ohlin output-capital or cones of diversification relationship (see Leamer 1984;
Schott 2003). One might wonder, then, why was our theory needed? For one, improve-
ments in quality are very different empirically from capital deepening. More importantly,
this prediction is just one of several predictions that arise in our model, and all these pre-
dictions flow from the fact that there is imperfect competition. Imperfect competition is
needed to ensure that firms are large and markets concentrated (as in table 1), that differ-
ent qualities coexist, that prices are a nonconstant markup over marginal cost, that prices
are correlated with quality, and that export shares are correlated with income in ways that
reflect quality. In short, our output-quality relationship is just one of several predictions.
The output prediction in isolation can be modeled more simply; however, we are inter-
ested in a bundle of predictions that require us to append an imperfectly competitive mar-
ket structure onto a trade model. Thus, a cones of diversification Heckscher-Ohlin model
delivers at best only a small part of what is needed and a more natural trade model in our
setting is the Ricardian model, which emphasizes the role of technological capability for
delivering quality.
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Allshow empirically, most goods have wide product ranges, we might expect
this type of no-growth shift in product mix to be common. By the same
token, a country may move from being poor to being rich without chang-
ing its product mix: this happens when it improves the quality of the wide
product range goods that it already exports. In short, GDP per worker de-
pends not just on what a country produces (as in Hausmann et al. 2007)
but on the quality of what is produced.VI. DataTrade data are from COMTRADE for 2005. We use the four-digit SITC
revision 2 classification (henceforth SITC4).18 To verify that all of our
cross-sectional results hold for more detailed commodity breakdowns,
we also use the 2005 COMTRADE data at the six-digit HS level (1996 re-
vision; henceforth HS6) and the 2005 US import data at the 10-digit HS
level (henceforth HS10). We exclude countries whose population was
less than 2million in 2005 or whose territorial integrity changed substan-
tially between 1980 and 2005, for example, the USSR. (The exception is
Germany, which we include.) This leaves us with the 94 countries listed
in Appendix G. GDP per capita and population data are from the United
Nations. We do not use a purchasing power parity adjustment because we
are interested in nominal price competition in world product markets.VII. Product RangesA key prediction of our theory is that in general, equilibrium countries
with different quality capabilities may nevertheless export the same good.
See the product range in figure 3. While we do not observe quality, an
observable implication is that at least some goods will be produced by
both rich and poor countries. To investigate, we build on Schott’s (2004)
earlier and highly influential observation about “product overlap.” For each
product g we identify the poorest and richest exporters of the product.
Denote these by ymin,g and ymax,g, respectively. In constructing these we
avoid “noise” associated with small reported export values, a problem
to which trade data are notoriously prone, by looking only at the set of
countries for which good g is a “significant” export. A good is a significant
export for a country if the value of exports of that good constitutes at least
1 percent of the value of exports of the country’s principal export good.19
An important theoretical reason for using this 1 percent cutoff is that it18 This allows us to go back to 1980 for a large number of countries and check that our
results hold for these earlier years.
19 More formally, let ℓ index countries, let g index goods, let Xgℓ be the value of country
ℓ ’s exports of good g, and let ogX g ℓ be country ℓ ’s total exports. Identify the good that ac-
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the general equilibrium wage impacts on which our theory rests.
Product ranges are displayed in figure 4. Each point corresponds to a
unique SITC4 good (g), and the figure plots (ymin,g, ymax,g). A point there-
fore shows the range of income levels of countries for which g is a signif-
icant export. All the points necessarily lie above the 45-degree line. For
reference, along the axes we show the log GDP per capita of Nepal,
China, Poland, and the United States.
The striking feature of figure 4 is the preponderance of points in the
top-left corner, that is, the preponderance of products for which the in-
come range is very wide. To get a clearer sense of magnitudes, consider
goods with product ranges for which ymax,g2 ymin,g > 4. For such goods the
richest significant exporter is at least 55 times richer than its poorest sig-
nificant exporter (e 4p 55). These are huge differences. And there are a
lot of goods in this region: the region contains 50 percent of all products
displayed in the figure and accounts for 73 percent of world trade in our
547 products.
We will shortly show the reader that this observation about wide prod-
uct ranges is robust and holds even in the most detailed trade data
(HS10). However, we first draw three economic insights from the wide-
ness of product ranges. The first deals with Hausmann et al. (2007).
Their exercise uses all goods in a country’s export basket even though
products with wide ranges are “uninformative” about a country’s income
in the sense that knowing that a wide range product is a significant con-
tributor to a country’s export basket tells us little about the country’s in-
come. Figure 4 shows that such “uninformativeness” is the norm rather
than the exception.
Second, our theory emphasizes that for each product, multiple quality
levels can coexist in equilibrium. One can therefore interpret the wide
ranges as support for the theory provided that one is willing to accept
that product ranges are the result of quality differences. As is well known,
quality is difficult to identify without detailed data about product charac-
teristics. Since we do not have this information, we refer to the ranges as
product ranges rather than as quality ranges and take the weaker posi-
tion that wide product ranges are implied by the theory but do not imply
the theory.
Third, there are two distinct groups of points that lie far from the top-
left corner in figure 4. These are “informative” products. The first group
lies to the bottom left and consists of those goods exported only by low-counts for the largest share of country ℓ ’s exports, i.e., the good with the largest Xgℓ/Xℓ. Call
this good g(ℓ). Then good g is a significant export of country ℓ if X gℓ=X ℓ > 0:01X g ðℓ Þ;ℓ=X ℓ .
Next, let K(g) be the set of countries for which g is a significant export. Then ymin,g is the
poorest country in K(g) and ymax,g is the richest country in K(g).
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Allincome and middle-income countries. The second group lies to the top
right and consists of those goods exported only by high-income coun-
tries. On our present interpretation, low- and middle-income goods are
not produced by high-income countries because their wage costs are too
high, whereas high-income goods are not produced by low- and middle-
income countries because their quality capabilities are too low.
The reader will and should be skeptical about the wide product ranges
in figure 4. For the remainder of this section we anticipate five possible
objections to the figure.
1. It is all aggregation bias.—One would expect that the large product
ranges displayed in figure 4 would become much narrower with finer
product-level data. This is not the case. In figure 5 we repeat the exercise
using HS6 data (world trade data from COMTRADE) and using HS10
data (US import data). The distributions of product ranges in figures 4FIG. 4.—Product ranges. Each point represents an SITC4 product. The horizontal axis is
ln ymin,g, the poorest country for which the product is a significant export. The vertical axis
is ln ymax,g, the richest country for which the product is a significant export.This content downloaded from 158.143.129.136 on October 24, 2018 02:07:43 AM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Alland 5 are very similar. In particular, product ranges remain large, and
about half of the world exports of the plotted goods are accounted for
by uninformative products in the top left (ln ymax,g > ln ymin,g 1 4).20
2. Finer disaggregation is always better.—The fact that nothing changes
when moving to finer levels of product disaggregation may seem puz-
zling, since if the move to a finer level of aggregation involved the break-
ing up of technologically disparate subindustries into individual indus-
tries, we might expect the range to narrow as we move to this new level
of aggregation. An examination of the way in which industries are broken
up in the HS6 and HS10 data throws light on why disaggregation beyond
SITC4 does not alter the distribution of ranges. In some cases the SITC4
industry is as disaggregated as the HS6 and even the HS10 industries; for
example, new tires for motor cars is a single category in both SITC4 and
HS6. In other cases, the disaggregation is based only on size or value,
without any reference to capabilities; for example, new tires for motor
cars feeds into seven HS10 codes that distinguish between technology-
ambiguous differences in the diameter of the tire. In yet other cases the
SITC4 code is disaggregated only by introducing a capability-irrelevant
“parts of ” HS6 or HS10 code. This is pervasive; for example, see the
HS6 categories associated with SITC4 7817, nuclear reactors. Finally, in
those cases in which a technology-based disaggregation of products is in-
troduced, it is often unclear whether this disaggregation conveys any in-
formation about differences in required capabilities; for example, SITC4
7252, machinery for making paper pulp, paper, paperboard; cutting ma-
chines, is disaggregated in HS10 into a number of industries, including
machines for making paper bags etc. andmachines for making paper car-
tons etc. Thus, finer disaggregation is typically not more informative
about quality capabilities. Were an ideal disaggregation of industries to
be constructed on the basis of the quality capabilities required, this would
doubtless lead to some narrowing in the relevant ranges. However, the
limitations of the published data are quite serious even at the most disag-
gregated level.21
3. Estimation error.—Another possible objection to our wide product
ranges is that we have not reported standard errors. Let N sigg be the num-20 In fig. 5 there are thousands of points, many of which lie on top of each other. To
make the figure clearer, instead of plotting ln ymax,g on the vertical axis we have plotted
ln ymax;g 1 e, where e is a uniformly distributed random variable on (20.05, 0.05). This adds
a tiny random vertical shift to the data, which helps the reader see where the bulk of points
are located. Likewise, we have added a tiny random horizontal shift to ln ymin,g.
21 For what we are doing, the relevant market is never equatable with an item in a gov-
ernment commodity classification, be it SITC4, HS6, or HS10. Sometimes the relevant mar-
ket is more detailed than HS10 (as in many electronic parts) and sometimes the relevant
market is less detailed than SITC4 (as in many apparel products). Thus, all of our conclu-
sions must be thought of relative to a definition of the market that is determined by the
commodity classification, not the actual product producers.
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products with wide ranges are products for which N sigg is small, that is,
for which there are very few observations and hence large standard er-
rors. This is not the case; indeed, the opposite is true. The correlation
between N sigg and the product range ln ymax,g 2 ln ymin,g is positive (.57),
and, for example, products with N sigg ≥ 20 (one-quarter of all products)
all have large product ranges. However, to deal with this objection in the
simplest way possible, in figures 4 and 5 we have displayed only those
products for which there are at least three significant exporters (N sigg ≥ 3).
That is, we displayed only 547 of the possible 746 SITC4 goods. These
547 products account for 98.3 percent of world trade so that we are ex-
cluding only very minor products. We conclude from this that wide prod-
uct ranges are not an artifact of statistical uncertainty. To be safe though,
we will continue throughout this paper to restrict attention only to prod-
ucts for which N sigg ≥ 3.
4. Wide product ranges are an artifact of using a 1 percent cutoff for “signif-
icant exporters.”—Again, this is not the case. Online appendix figure B1
shows that the inference we have drawn from figures 4 and 5 is insensi-
tive to the choice of cutoffs. It repeats figure 4 for a low percentage cutoff
(0.1 percent), a high percentage cutoff (10 percent), and cutoffs based
on mixtures of percentages and dollar values (xgk > $5 million or xgk >
$50 million). In every case the pattern displayed in figures 4 and 5 is re-
peated.23
5.Wide product ranges are driven by China.—Omitting China does not al-
ter the impression that product ranges are wide. Indeed, the reader can
omit China from these figures simply by deleting all points for which ei-
ther ln ymin,gp 7.5 or ln ymax,gp 7.5 (China’s log GDP per capita is 7.5).
Having established the robustness of figure 4, we can now restate our
conclusion. Our theory implies that there will be product ranges: the
empirical surprise is that product ranges are often so large.VIII. Market Share PredictionsFigure 3 presented our predictions about a country’s share of world ex-
ports. Underlying that figure is a comparative static in which a country22 The number N sigg is the dimension of K(g) in fn. 19.
23 There is a minor technical point about fig. 5 that should be reviewed. Since the United
States is far from most countries and since trade costs increase in distance, we expect that
countries’ exports to the United States will bemore concentrated on a few goods than their
exports to the world. This is indeed the case. Therefore, for the HS10 panel of fig. 5, which
is based on US data, we use a 0.1 percent cutoff instead of a 1 percent cutoff. This results in
far more points in the figure but does not alter the distribution of points in the figure. See
online app. fig. B1 for the HS10 figure using a 1 percent cutoff.
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Allthat previously specialized in producing good k2 1 first sees its quality in
good k rise up from a very low level to that of the world standard and
then sees its quality in good k 1 1 rise up from a very low level to that
of the world standard. This comparative static highlighted two mecha-
nisms affecting world export shares. First, as capabilities rise in good k,
the country produces more of k and gains an increasing share of world
exports. This is the direct or quality effect. Second, as quality rises for
good k1 1 wages are pushed up, which erodes the country’s competitive-
ness in good k. This is the general equilibrium Ricardian or wage effect.
These two mechanisms lead to the world export share predictions in fig-
ures 2 and 3. For middle-capability goods (k), world export shares dis-
play an inverted-U-shaped relationship with income as first the quality
effect and then the wage effect come into play. For low-capability goods
(k2 1), the wage effect is dominant and world export shares tend to de-
cline in income. For high-capability goods (k 1 1), the quality effect is
dominant and world export shares tend to increase in income; see fig-
ure 3.
We operationalize these distinct export share predictions of goods k2
1, k, and k 1 1 as follows. Consider figure 4. In our baseline method we
draw two vertical lines on the figure, one at some income c and another
at some higher income c. This divides all points in the figure into three
groups. Good g is in group k2 1 if ln ymin;g ≤ c , in group k if c < ln ymin;g ≤
c, and in group k 1 1 if ln ymin;g > c. In our baseline specification we
choose the c and c so that one-third of countries are in each group
(c 5 6:81 and c 5 8:5). In our alternative method, we draw two horizon-
tal lines on figure 4, which divides goods into three groups based on ymax,g
rather than ymin,g. As we shall see, the two methods yield almost identical
results. Further, we will show that our results are not sensitive to the
choices of c and c.
In defining groups, we must eliminate the “uninformative” goods to
the top left of figure 4. We do so in two ways. First, we exclude goods with
the widest product ranges, that is, goods g for which ln ymax;g 2 ln ymin;g > d.
In our baseline specification we use d p 4 and show below that our re-
sults are not very sensitive to the choice of d. Second, in terms of the the-
ory, the low and middle groups should consist of goods that are produced
only by low- and middle-income countries, not high-income countries
such as Germany that are famous for high quality. We therefore exclude
from the low and middle groups those goods with ln ymax;g ≥ ln yGermany 5
10:4.
Since we will be pooling product ranges that have different ranges of
incomes (both mean and variance), it is essential that we recenter and
normalize incomes within product ranges. Letting ℓ index countries, de-
fine normalized GDP per capita, normalized within product range g, asThis content downloaded from 158.143.129.136 on October 24, 2018 02:07:43 AM
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ℓ
2 mg
jg
 :
We consider three alternative normalizations, that is, three alternative
definitions of (mg, jg).
• Baseline normalization: In our baseline specification we consider
the set of countries with positive exports of g and define mg and jg
as the median and interquartile range, respectively, of the ln yℓ in
this set.
Using medians and interquartile ranges has the advantage of being ro-
bust to outliers.
• Alternative normalization 1: Again consider the set of countries with
positive exports of g and let ln y
g
and ln y
g
be theminimumandmax-
imum, respectively, of the ln yℓ in this set. Thenmg 5 ðln yg 1 ln yg Þ=2
and jg 5 ln yg 2 ln yg .
• Alternative normalization 2: mg 5 ðln ymin;g 1 ln ymax;g Þ=2 and jg 5
ln ymax;g 2 ln ymin;g .
24
All three normalizations are centered on 0 and yield similar results.
We also need a normalization for the level of exports. This will be af-
fected, as the theory indicates, by product market size and country size.
The global market size for product g is given by Sg (or, equivalently, dg) in
the theory; see Section II.A. To control for Sg, we scale country ℓ ’s exports
of good g, Xgℓ, by world exports of g, X g ; ΣℓX g ℓ . To control for country
size we scale X g ℓ=X g by its average Σg ðX g ℓ=X g Þ=nℓ , where nℓ is the number
of goods exported by country ℓ.25 Summarizing, we plot
ðNormalized GDP per CapitaÞ
g ℓ
;
ln y
ℓ
2 mg
jg
ð17Þ24 Note that y
g
differs from ymin,g. The former is the minimum across all countries that ex-
port any positive amount of good g while the latter is the minimum across all countries for
which g is a significant export; likewise for the difference between yg and ymax,g.
25 This normalization comes from a simple extension of our theory. In the theory, all
countries have the same size L. When country sizes are allowed to differ so that labor forces
become Lℓ, then the eq. (6) labor market-clearing condition becomes Lℓ 5 Hog∈Gℓ xg ℓ ,
where Gℓ is the set of goods produced by country ℓ. Thus, conditional on the set of goods
a country produces, larger countries will, on average, have higher output per good pro-
duced. It follows that larger countries will, on average, have higher exports per good ex-
ported, i.e., higher Σg ðX g ℓ=X g Þ=nℓ .
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Allagainst
ðNormalized World Export ShareÞ
g ℓ
;
ðX g ℓ=X g Þ
ð1=nℓ ÞΣg ðX g ℓ=X g Þ ; ð18Þ
where the numerator is country ℓ’s share of world exports of g and the
denominator is country ℓ’s average share of world exports.
Figure 6 plots normalized world export shares against normalized
GDP per capita for our three groups of goods. The first thing to note
about the plots is the preponderance of points on or very near the hor-
izontal axis. This reflects the fact that smaller countries have zero ex-
ports of many goods. Empirically, a group of goods requiring a given level
of manufacturing capability may be very large, and a small country that
specializes in the production of goods in this group will typically not pro-
duce all of the goods in the group. This point has been emphasized by
Eaton and Kortum (2002).26 Hence in interpreting these scatters, our fo-
cus of interest lies not on means—which tend to be dominated by the
many (g, ℓ) pairs with zero and near-zero exports—but on the upper
bound of the scatter. With this in mind, we estimate a quantile regression
(the 90th quantile). This appears as the curve shown in each of the pan-
els of figure 6.27
The upper, middle, and lower panels correspond to low-group goods
(k 2 1), middle-group goods (k), and high-group goods (k 1 1), respec-
tively. The panels bear out the inverted-U predictions of the model. World
export shares are decreasing in income for the low group, are increasing
in income for the high group, and display an inverted-U relationship for
the middle group. This is exactly as predicted in figure 3 and is a key take-
away of this paper.28
Specification searches.—Underlying figure 6 are a large number of spec-
ification choices: the choice of normalization, the choice of grouping
goods vertically using ymin,g or horizontally using ymax,g, the choice of
group boundaries (c and c), the choice in defining “uninformative”
goods (d in ymax;g 2 ymin;g > d), the choice between SITC4 and HS6, and26 One feature that we do not model but that captures this is that producing any product
involves some fixed cost. A large country has the labor force to produce all products within
the group or groups in which it specializes. A small country has the labor force to produce
only a small number of products within some single group. See the closely related point
regarding heterogeneous country sizes in the second-last paragraph of Sec. III.
27 We use the SAS 9.2 QUANTREG procedure with a polynomial of order n, where n is
determined using standard 1 percent significance tests.
28 There are a few extreme “vertical” outliers that would “squash” fig. 6 down to the hor-
izontal axis if displayed. Rather than leave them off the figure entirely, we shrink them to-
ward the horizontal axis as follows. In the top panel, if a vertical point y exceeds 5, then it is
replaced by 51 f(D), where Dp y2 5 and f ðDÞ 5 lnð11 DÞ=5 so that f(0)p 0 and f 0 > 0;
likewise for the middle and bottom panels, but with 5 replaced by 3 and 4.5, respectively.
This does not have any effect on the position of the quantile regressions.
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FIG. 6.—Normalized world market shares. Each point in the plot corresponds to a
product-country (g, ℓ ) pair. The vertical axis is country ℓ ’s share of world exports of good
g, normalized as in equation (18). The horizontal axis is country ℓ ’s income, normalized
as in equation (17). The figure uses the baseline specification: c 5 6:81, c 5 8:50, dp 4,
mg is the median GDP per capita for exporters of g, jg is the corresponding interquartile
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Allsome less explicit choices surrounding quantile estimation. The only
feature of figure 6 that is sensitive to these specification choices is the
monotonicity displayed in the top panel. In some specifications the
top panel displays an inverted-U shape, though, reassuringly, with a max-
imum to the far left of the panel. This far-left maximum is consistent
both with having defined the low group too broadly (so that it includes
somemiddle goods) and with imprecise estimation caused by too few ob-
servations at the extreme left of the panel.
For the remainder of the section we briefly review a large number of
alternative specifications that hit on each of the specification choices
listed above. In each case, the results are identical to those of figure 6
(with the exception of the above-mentioned far-left maximum in the top
panel). Online appendix figure B2 uses ymax,g to group goods. Online ap-
pendix figure B3 varies the group boundaries c and c. In the first column
of panels, the low-group results are presented for the cases in which the
baseline boundary c 5 6:81 takes on the values 5.6, 6.0, 6.4, and 6.8. In
the third column of panels, the middle-group results are presented for
the cases in which the baseline boundary c 5 6:81 takes on the values
6.0, 6.4, 6.81, and 7.2. In the middle column of panels, the middle-group
results are presented for the cases in which the baseline boundary c 5
8:5 takes on the values 7.0, 8.0, 8.5, and 9.0. Even stronger results hold
for the high group (not reported). Online appendix figure B4 reports
the results for the two alternative normalizations of GDP per capita.
Online appendix figure B5 reports results for six-digit HS goods. Be-
cause there are many more goods, we are able to divide the sample into
four groups, each with one-quarter of the 94 countries in the sample.
Online figure B6 examines the role of the optimal polynomial fitted
to the quantiles. Online figure B7 examines the impact of changing
the definition of uninformative goods (d in the expression ymax;g 2
ymin;g > d); d takes on the values 2, 3, 4, and ∞. From online figures
B2–B7, it is apparent that figure 6 and our inverted-U results are not sen-
sitive to our specification choices.29IX. Development Ladders in the Cross Section:
The Role of Product RangesAppendix H shows that at the HS10 level, unit value import indexes
(prices) are correlated with income within each product range (as in29 There are a series ofmoreminor specification choices that also do notmatter. In eq. (18)
we normalizedworld export sharesXg ℓ=Xg by average world export shares n21l Σg ðXg ℓ=Xg Þ. We
have experimented extensively with alternative normalizations of Xg ℓ=Xg , including the
50th, 75th, 90th, and 99th percentiles of each country’s world export shares. (For each
country ℓ these are percentiles of the set fX 1ℓ=X 1;…;Xg ℓ=X g ;…;XGℓ=XGg.) All of these nor-
malizations produce curves with the same shapes as those in fig. 6. Also, we reported
quantile regressions based on the 90th quantile. The curves do not change when, e.g.,
we drop down to the 80th quantile or rise up to the 99th quantile.
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wider ranges of unit value import indexes. Wide product ranges, their
correlation with unit values, and, most importantly, our inverted-U rela-
tionship all suggest that a country’s wealth depends not just on what
goods it produces but also on the quality of the goods produced.
To investigate further, let L goods denote the low- and middle-group
goods of figure 6 and let H goods denote the high-group goods in fig-
ure 6. Figure 7 shows the relationship of a country’s GDP per capita with
(a) the share of L goods in its export basket (left panel) and (b) the share
of H goods in its export basket (right panel). We see a clear fall in the
share of L goods and a rise in the share of H goods as GDP per capita
increases. But an important feature of figure 7 lies in the fact that the
relation between the product mix and income is not bidirectional: while
significant exporters of H goods are necessarily rich, it is not the case
that rich countries are necessarily significant exporters of H goods. A
very low contribution of H goods is consistent with a relatively high level
of GDP per capita (see Malaysia in the right-hand panel). Similarly, while
a high share of L goods necessarily implies that a country is poor, many
poor countries have a low share of L goods (see Burundi or Zimbabwe in
the left-hand panel).
We can restate this in a way that makes one of the key points of our
thesis crystal clear. A poor country can advance out of L goods and still
remain poor: this happens when the country enters as a low-quality pro-FIG. 7.—The share of L and H goods in each country’s export basket. Each point rep-
resents a country (there are 94 points in each panel). The horizontal axis is log GDP per
capita in 2005. The vertical axis is a country’s exports of L goods (right panel) or H goods
(left panel) as a share of the country’s total exports. The L goods are goods in the low and
middle groups of figure 6; H goods are goods in the high group of figure 6.This content downloaded from 158.143.129.136 on October 24, 2018 02:07:43 AM
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Allducer into uninformative goods, that is, goods with wide quality ranges.
Since most goods are uninformative, we might expect this type of no-
growth shift in product mix to be common. By the same token, a country
may move from being poor to being rich without changing its product
mix: this happens when it improves the quality of the uninformative,
wide quality range goods that it already exports.X. ConclusionsThe aim of this paper has been to explore the way in which advances in
wealth are associated both with changes in the product mix and with
changes in quality (and productivity) within a given set of industries.
The central point relates to the fact that the range of income levels of
significant exporters of most products is very wide. At a theoretical level,
one reason for the wide product ranges lies in aggregation of disparate
subindustries (though the result is not sensitive to the level of aggrega-
tion); another reason lies in the fact that within any industry, in a general
equilibriummulticountry setting, there will be a product range, that is, a
coexistence of producers from countries with different income levels. In
this product range, poor low-quality exporters compete with rich high-
quality exporters.
The central property of product ranges is that, in a multimarket gen-
eral equilibrium setting, the relation between quality and price on the
one hand and output and global market share on the other is nonmono-
tonic. There is at equilibrium a range of producer qualities (and so wealth
levels) that are viable in a given industry. As quality rises, the country moves
into the production of higher-ranked goods, and its equilibrium wage
(and GDP per capita) rises. But this means that its output and global mar-
ket share both exhibit an inverted-U relationship with quality, and so with
GDP per capita. As quality rises, market share rises, and wages rise also. As
the country advances into the production of higher-ranked products, the
rise in wage causes its effective cost level to rise and its global market
share in this industry to fall. It is this inverted-U relation that is the basis
of the selection effect that links a country’s wealth to its product mix.Appendix A
The Cournot Equilibrium and Derivation of Equations (2) and (3)
Consider good m. Since there is no horizontal differentiation, all firms charge
the same quality-adjusted price p*
m
(p pi/ui). Let x*i ; xiui and w*i 5 wici=ui be
quality-adjusted quantity and effective cost, respectively. Cobb-Douglas demand
implies Sm 5 oj p*mx*j so thatThis content downloaded from 158.143.129.136 on October 24, 2018 02:07:43 AM
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m
5
Sm
oj x*j
 and 
∂p*
m
∂x*i
5 2
Sm
ðoj x*jÞ2
¼ 2 p
*2
m
Sm
: ðA1Þ
Firms choose quality-adjusted output x*i to maximize profits pi 5 ðp*m 2 w*i Þx*i .
The first-order condition together with equation (A1) imply that the quality-
adjusted optimal output is x*i 5 ðp*m 2 w*i ÞSm=p*2m . Summing over active firms i p
1,…, Nm yields
o
j
x*j 5 NmSmp*m 2
 
o
j
w*j
!
Sm=p*
2
m
:
Plugging oj x*j 5 Sm=p*m (from eq. [A1]) into this equation and simplifying yields
p*
m
5 ðojw*j Þ=ðN m 2 1Þ, that is, equation (2). Plugging this back into
x*i 5 ðp*m 2 w*i ÞSm=p*2m
5 ðp
i
=ui 2 wici=uiÞSm=ðpi=uiÞ2
5 uið1=piÞð12 wici=piÞSm
yields equation (3).Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma 3. Let Kg and Kg 0 be the sets of country types that produce goods in
groups g and g
0
, respectively. If Kg 0 is a proper subset of Kg (Kg 0⊂Kg), then pg 0 >
p
g
.
Proof. Since Kg 0 is a proper subset of Kg , we can write Kg as Kg 5 Kg 0 [ A for
some set A. From equation (4),
p
g 0
5
ok∈Kg 0N kwk
ok∈Kg 0N k 2 1
 and   p
g
5
ok∈Kg 0N kwk 1ok∈AN kwk
ok∈Kg 0N k 1ok∈AN k 2 1
:
In equilibrium, k produces g if and only if wk < pg. Hence
p
g
<
ok∈Kg 0N kwk 1ok∈AN kpg
ok∈Kg 0N k 1ok∈AN k 2 1
:
Cross-multiplying yields 
o
k∈Kg 0
N k 1 o
k∈A
N k 2 1
!
p
g
< o
k∈Kg 0
N kwk 1 o
k∈A
N kpg
or  
o
k∈Kg 0
N k 2 1
!
p
g
< o
k∈Kg 0
N kwkThis content downloaded from 158.143.129.136 on October 24, 2018 02:07:43 AM
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Allor
p
g
<
 
o
k∈Kg 0
Nkwk
!, 
o
k∈Kg 0
Nk 2 1
!
5 p
g 0
:
QED
Lemma 4. Each type k country produces and produces only goods gp gk, . . . ,
k for some group of goods gk ≤ k.
Proof. Recall that gk is the lowest-ranked group of goods produced by a type k
country so that the lemma states that each country type produces and produces
only goods in an interval gk, . . . , k. Suppose that the lemma is false. Then there is
some type k
0
country that produces goods in some group g but not group g 1 1
where g1 1 ≤ k0. Equivalently, suppose that p
g11
≤ wk 0 < pg for g1 1 ≤ k
0
. The set of
producers of groups of goods g and g 1 1 are
Kg ; f k :  wk < pg ; k ≥ g  g;
Kg11 ; f  k :  wk < pg11; k ≥ g 1 1 g :
Since p
g11
≤ wk 0 , the set A ; f  k    : wk < wk0 ; k ≥ g 1 1g contains Kg11. Mathemati-
cally, Kg11 ⊆A. Since wk 0 < pg , the set B ; fk : wk < wk0 ; k ≥ g  g is contained in Kg .
Mathematically, B ⊆Kg . But A ⊆B. Hence Kg11 ⊆ A ⊆ B ⊆ Kg or Kg11 ⊆Kg . If Kg11
⊂Kg , then, by lemma 3, pg11 > pg . If Kg11 5 Kg , then pg11 5 pg . Hence pg11 ≥ pg ,
which contradicts p
g11
≤ wk 0 < pg . QED
Lemma 5. pg is strictly increasing in g.
Proof. Group g goods are produced by some country type k. If k does not pro-
duce g2 1, then p
g21
≤ wk < pg , as required. If k does produce g2 1, then it must
be that pg21 < pg. For suppose not, that pg21 ≥ pg . Since pg > wk ⇒ pg21 > wk , all pro-
ducers of g profitably produce g2 1. In addition, by lemma 4, type (g2 1) coun-
tries also produce g2 1. (They of course cannot produce g.) Thus, the set of pro-
ducers of g is a proper subset of the set of producers of g 2 1. It follows from
lemma 3 that p
g
> p
g21
. This contradicts our maintained assumption of p
g21
≥
p
g
, as required. QED
Lemma 6. Suppose wk ≥ wk21, kp 2, . . . , K. Then for each gp 1, . . . , K, there
exists a kg such that group g goods are produced by and only by country types kp
g, . . . , kg.
Proof. Group g goods are produced by some country. Let kg be the highest-
ranked country that produces good g. Then wkg < pg . By the hypothesis of the
lemma, wk ≤ wkg for all k < kg so that wk < pg for all k < kg. Hence g is produced
by all country types k ≤ kg provided that those types are capable of producing
them, that is, provided that k ≥ g. QED
Lemma 7. In equilibrium, wk > wk21, kp 2, . . . , K.
Proof. Suppose not, that wk ≤ wk21 for some k. Since all countries have the
same labor supply L, it suffices to show that wk ≤ wk21 implies that labor demand
is higher in k than in k2 1. From equation (5), xjk 5 ð1=pjÞð12 wk=pjÞSj , so that
xj ;k21 ≤ xjk . This impliesThis content downloaded from 158.143.129.136 on October 24, 2018 02:07:43 AM
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j ∈Kk21
xj;k21
≤ H o
j ∈Kk21
xjk
≤ H o
j ∈Kk
xjk
5 L;
where Kk21 and Kk are the set of goods produced by country types k 2 1 and k,
respectively. The first line is the labor market-clearing condition for a type (k 2
1) country (eq. [5]); the second line follows from xjk ≤ xj;k21; the third line fol-
lows from the fact that wk21 < pj , and wk ≤ wk21 imply wk < pj so that j ∈Kk21 im-
plies j ∈Kk ; and the fourth line follows from labor market clearing in a type k
country. If either of the above inequalities holds strictly, then we have the contra-
diction L < L. Suppose wk < wk21. Then xjk < xj ;k21 for all j ∈Kk21 and the first in-
equality holds strictly. Suppose wk 5 wk21. Then the conditions of lemma 6 are
satisfied so that type k countries produce group k goods. Thus, type (k2 1) coun-
tries produce a proper subset of the goods produced by type k countries so that
oj ∈Kk21xjk < oj ∈Kk xjk and the second inequality holds strictly. QED
Lemma 8. kg is nondecreasing in g.
Proof. Suppose not, that kg11 < kg . Then by lemmas 7 and 6, group (g 1 1)
and group g goods are produced by the set of country types in the sets Kg11 ;
fk : g 1 1 ≤ k ≤ kg11g and Kg ; fk : g ≤ k ≤ kgg, respectively. Since g < g 1 1 ≤
kg11 < kg , we have Kg11⊂Kg and, by lemma 3, pg < pg11. Since pg < pg11 and coun-
try type kg produces g (wkg < pg), it follows that kg also produces g1 1 (wkg < pg11).
But then the highest-ranked producer of g1 1 is at least kg, that is, kg11 ≥ kg . This
is a contradiction. QED
Lemma 9. gk is nondecreasing in k.
Proof. Suppose not, that g
k
< g
k21 for some k ≥ 2. Lemma 4 implies that good
gk is produced by country types k and gk. Good gk21 is the lowest-ranked good pro-
duced by country k2 1 so that good gk (< gk21) is not produced by k2 1. It follows
that good gk is produced by countries gk and k, but not country k2 1. Further, the
definition of gk21 implies that gk21 ≤ k 2 1 so that g k < g k21 ≤ k 2 1 < k. It follows
that good gk is not produced by an interval of countries. But lemma 6 implies that
all goods are produced by intervals of countries, a contradiction. QED
Lemma 10. For a type k country let fgk ; Hxgk=L be the share of the labor force
employed in group g goods. Let Fkðg Þ 5 ogj51 f jk be the share of the labor force
employed in groups ranked g or less. Then Fkðg Þ < Fk21ðg Þ for g 5 g k21; : : : ; k 2 1
and Fkðg Þ 5 Fk21ðg Þ 5 1 for g p k; that is, Fk first-order stochastic dominates
Fk21. (Economically, employment in k is skewed toward higher-ranked goods.)
Proof. Recall that gk21 and gk are defined as the lowest-ranked goods produced
by countries of type k 2 1 and k, respectively. Lemma 4 states that a type (k 2 1)
country produces and produces goods only in groups g 5 g
k21;…; k 2 1 and
a type k country produces and produces goods only in groups g 5 g
k
;…; k.
Lemma 9 states that g
k21 ≤ g k . Consider goods in the region g k21;…; g k 2 1.
If the region exists, then goods in the region are produced by country type k 2 1This content downloaded from 158.143.129.136 on October 24, 2018 02:07:43 AM
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Allbut not k. Hence f
gk
5 0 < f
g ;k21 so that F kðg Þ < F k21ðg Þ for g 5 g k21;…; g k 2 1, as
required. Consider goods in the region g
k
; : : : ; k 2 1. Goods in this region are
produced by country types k2 1 and k. Hence, fgk and fg,k21 are strictly positive and
fgk 2 fg ;k21 ¼
Hxgk
L
2
Hxg ;k21
L
¼ H
p
g
 
12
wk
p
g
!
Sg
L
2
H
p
g
 
12
wk21
p
g
!
Sg
L
¼ H
Lðp
g
Þ2 ðwk21 2 wkÞSg < 0 :
It follows that f
gk
< f
g ;k21 for g 5 gk21;…; k 2 1. Since good k is produced by coun-
try k but not country k 2 1, Fkðk 2 1Þ < Fk21ðk 2 1Þ 5 1. Thus, Fkðg Þ < Fk21ðg Þ for
g 5 g
k21;…; k 2 1 as required. QED
Proof of proposition 1. Part 1 follows immediately from lemmas 6 and 8. Part 3
follows immediately from lemmas 4 and 9. Consider part 2. By lemma 7, wk is
strictly increasing in k. By lemma 5, pg is strictly increasing in g. It remains to show
that yk is strictly increasing in k. We can write yk as
y
k
5 H o
k
g5g k
p
g
xgk =L 5 o
k
g5g k
p
g
f
gk
:
From lemma 5, pg is strictly increasing in g. From lemma 10, Fk(g) first-order sto-
chastic dominates Fk21(g) (and strictly so for some g). Hence yk > yk21.30 QEDAppendix C
Proof of Proposition 2
From footnote 12, (pg, wk) simultaneously solves equation (4) or pk 5 wkNk=ðNk 2
1Þ and equation (6) or L 5 Hxkk 5 H ð1=pkÞð12 wk=pkÞSk . Solving these trivially
yields equation (7). Footnote 12 also contains the derivation of the expressions
for the markup, yk, Hpkk, and net exports. It follows from the derivation and the
definition of equilibrium that fwk ; pkgKk51 is an equilibrium if and if only each firm
in each type k country finds it unprofitable to produce each group g good for
which g < k. A necessary and sufficient condition for such unprofitability is de-
rived next.
If a firm from a type k country produces a group g good, then the price of the
group g good is
p 0
g
5
1
ðNg 1 1Þ2 1 ðNgwg 1 wkÞ;
where we have used equation (4) and the facts that there are Ng firms from type g
countries and one firm from a type k country. We require equilibrium wages and
prices to be such that30 See online app. E.1 for a step-by-step proof of this argument.
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1
Ng
ðNgwg 1 wkÞ
or
Ng 2 1
Ng
wk ≥ wg  :
Plugging in the equation (7) expression for wages yields
Ng 2 1
Ng
 
Nk 2 1
Nk
HSk
LNk
!
≥
 
Ng 2 1
Ng
HSg
LNg
!
 :
Hence, no firm from a type k country will produce a group g good for which g < k
if and only if
Ng
Sg
≥
Nk
Nk 2 1
Nk
Sk
for g 5 1;…;   k 2 1 and k 5 2;…;K : ðC1Þ
To summarize, equation (C1) is necessary and sufficient for a perfect-sorting
equilibrium.
Finally, we show that equation (C1) holds if and only if the PSC holds. Equa-
tion (C1) obviously implies the PSC. Conversely, the PSC together with Nk ≥ 2
imply
Ng
Sg
≥
Ng11
Ng11 2 1
Ng11
Sg11
>
Ng11
Sg11
≥ ⋯ >
Nk21
Sk21
≥
Nk
Nk 2 1
Nk
Sk
;
that is, they imply equation (C1). It follows that the PSC is necessary and suffi-
cient for all equilibria to display perfect sorting. QED
Appendix D
Equivalence of the PSC and Nk21 ≥ Nk 1 2
When Skp S for all k, the PSC can be written as N k21 ≥ fk , where fk ; N 2k=ðNk 2
1Þ. Then fk can be rewritten as fk 5 Nk 1 11 ½1=ðNk 2 1Þ, where, since Nk ≥ 2,
1=ðNk 2 1Þ∈ ð0; 1. Thus, we have that fk ∈ ðN k 1 1;N k 1 2. Hence, the PSC
Nk21 ≥ fk implies Nk21 > Nk 1 1, which, given that the Nk are integers, implies
Nk21 ≥ Nk 1 2. Conversely, failure of the PSC (Nk21 < fk) implies Nk21 < Nk 1 2.
Appendix E
Allowing for Quality Differences across Producers
In the main text we made three symmetry assumptions: (1) the number of work-
ers is the same for all country types (Lkp L); (2) if a country type is able to pro-
duce a good, then it does so at a standard level of quality that is independent of
its country type (uk p u);31 and (3) inverse productivity is normalized to unity31 Recall that quality comparisons are never made across goods, so we do not subscript
quality uk by g.
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All(ckp 1). The latter two points imply uk=ck 5 u. In this appendix we allow firms to
produce at different levels of quality. Specifically, we assume that
uk=ck ≥ uk21=ck21  for k ≥ 2  :
That is, higher-ranked countries produce at a higher level of quality or produc-
tivity. This means that at equilibrium, when a good is produced by firms from sev-
eral different country types, there will be a range of different quality levels of-
fered on the market.
This generalization turns out to be a trivial extension of the model provided
that we replace our usual assumption that the number of workers in a country
(Lk) is the same across countries (Lkp L) with the assumption that the number
of effective workers in a country L* ; Lkuk=ck is the same across countries
(L*k 5 L*). We maintain these assumptions throughout this appendix.
Recall that w*k ; wkck=uk , which we earlier referred to as “effective costs,” is the
cost of a unit of effective labor. Also, define quality-adjusted outputs x*gk ; xgkuk
and quality-adjusted prices
p*
g
5
1
okN k 2 1ok
N kw*k ; ð40Þ
where the sums are over the set of countries that produce group g goods. Equa-
tion (40) follows from equation (2) just as equation (4) followed from equation
(2). (As elsewhere in this paper, quality-adjusted prices are the same for all pro-
ducers of a good.) Because different producers of a good have different qualities
uk, they face different prices pgk ; p*g uk . We can now restate our propositions 1
and 2 for the case in which qualities differ across producers.
Proposition 6 (Product ranges). Assume that uk=ck ≥ uk21=ck21  for k ≥ 2.
1. A group g good is produced by a type k country if and only if kp g,…, kg
for some country type kg that is increasing in g. That is, each good is pro-
duced by an interval of country types and both boundaries of the interval
are increasing in g.
2. Each type k country produces and produces only goods g p gk,…, k for
some group of goods gk ≤ k. That is, each country produces an interval
of goods that is bounded above by the country’s most difficult-to-make
group of goods.
3. Wage wk, w*k ; wkck=uk , and yk are all strictly increasing in k ; that is, coun-
tries with scarce capabilities have high wages, high effective costs, and high
GDP per worker.
4. Prices pgk and p*g are strictly increasing in g; that is, hard-to-make goods
have high prices and high quality-adjusted prices.Proof. Just as equation (30) became equation (5), equation (30) now becomes
x*gk ¼
1
p*
g
 
12
w*k
p*
g
!
Sg ð50ÞThis content downloaded from 158.143.129.136 on October 24, 2018 02:07:43 AM
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g
> w*k and x
*
g k 5 0 otherwise. Because xgk units of output require xgkck units of
labor to produce, the labor market-clearing condition (eq. [6]) with ck ≠ 1 is Lk 5
Hog xgkck . Multiplying this through by uk/ck yields
L* 5 Ho
g
x*gk    : ð60Þ
Equations (40)–(60) establish that equations (4)–(6) continue to hold with qual-
ity differences, but with ðp*
g
;w*k ; x
*
gk ;L*Þ replacing ðpg ;wk ; xgk ;LÞ. Since proposi-
tion 1 of the main text was based solely on equations (4)–(6), it follows that
the proposition holds with ðp*
g
;w*k ; x
*
gk ;L*Þ replacing ðpg ;wk ; xgk ;LÞ. This estab-
lishes parts 1 and 2 of proposition 6. It also establishes that w*k is strictly increas-
ing in k, that y*k ; Hog p*g x*gk=L* is strictly increasing in k, and that p*g is strictly in-
creasing in g.
Consider the remainder of parts 3 and 4. From the definition of w*k we have
wk 5 w*kðuk=ckÞ. Since w*k is strictly increasing in k and uk/ck is weakly increasing
in k, wk is strictly increasing in k. Turning to GDP per worker, recall that yk ;
Hog pgkxgk=Lk , y*k ; Hog p*g x*gk=L*, and L* ; Lkuk=ck so that yk 5 ðuk=ckÞy*k . Since
y*k is strictly increasing in k and uk=ck is weakly increasing in k, yk is strictly increas-
ing in k. Turning to p
gk
; p*
g
uk , since p*g is increasing in g, so is pgk. QED
Proposition 7 (Perfect-sorting equilibria). Assume that uk=ck ≥ uk21=ck21 for
k ≥ 2.
1. An equilibrium displays perfect sorting if and only if the PSC of proposi-
tion 2 holds.
2. If the PSC holds, then there is a unique equilibrium set of product prices
and wages given by
p
kk
5 uk
 
HSk
L*Nk
!
and wk 5
uk
ck
 
Nk 2 1
Nk
HSk
L*Nk
!
      8k  : ðE1Þ
3. Markups, GDP per worker, total profits, and output per good are given by,
respectively,
p
kk
wkck
5
Nk
Nk 2 1
; yk 5
uk
ck
 
HSk
L*N k
!
 ;
Hpkk 5
HSk
N 2k
; xkk 5
1
uk
 
L*
H
!
:
Further, net exports of a group g good are ð12 dkH Þxkk if the good is ex-
ported (gp k) and 2dgHxkk if the good is imported (g ≠ k).Proof. Picking up from the proof of proposition 6, equations (4)–(6) hold,
but with ðpg ;wk ; xgk ;LÞ replaced by ðp*g ;w*k ; x*gk ;L*Þ. Since proposition 2 of the
main text was based solely on equations (4)–(6), it follows that proposition 2This content downloaded from 158.143.129.136 on October 24, 2018 02:07:43 AM
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Allholds with ðpg ; xgk ;wk ;LÞ replaced by ðp*g ; x*gk ;w*k ;L*Þ. Proposition 7 follows from
rewriting proposition 2 using ðp*
g
; x*gk ;w
*
k ;L*Þ and y*k (defined in the proof of
proposition 6) and then substituting in pg 5 pkk 5 ukp
*
k , wk 5 ðuk=ckÞw*k ,
p
kk
=ðwkckÞ 5 p*k=w*k , yk 5 ðuk=ckÞy*k , Hpkk 5 Hðpkk 2 wkckÞxkk 5 H ðp*k 2 w*kÞx*kk ,
and xkk 5 ð1=ukÞx*kk . QED
Appendix F
Proofs of Propositions 3–5 and Lemma 2
A. Equilibrium Conditions and Outcomes in Phase I
A typical type (k2 1) country producing a group (k2 1) good has wage wk21 and
price p
k21
. Rearranging equation (11) as 12 wk21=pk21 5 w=½pk21ðN k21 2 1Þ and
plugging this into equation (13) yields
L 5 H
w
p2
k21
ðNk21 2 1Þ
S
or
p
k21
5
 
HS
L
w
Nk21 2 1
!1=2
  : ð130Þ
Likewise, rearranging equation (12) as 12 wk=pk 5 ðwu=vkÞ=ðpkN kÞ and plug-
ging this into equation (14) yields
L 5 H
w
ðvk=uÞp2kNk
S
or
p
k
5
"
HS
L
w
ðvk=uÞNk
#1=2
  : ð140Þ
For the developing country, equations (9) and (10) imply p
k21
5 p
k21
and p
k
5
ðvk=uÞpk . Plugging these into equation (15) yields
L
HS
5
1
p
k21
 
12
w
p
k21
!
1
1
ðvk=uÞpk
"
12
w
ðvk=uÞpk
#
  : ð150Þ
Plugging equations (130) and (140) into equation (150) establishes that the equi-
librium wage in the developing country is
wðvkÞ
SðvkÞ 5
H
L
"
ðNk21 2 1Þ1=2 1 N 1=2k =ðvk=uÞ1=2
Nk21 1 Nk=ðvk=uÞ
#2
 : ðF1Þ
Plugging this back into equations (130) and (140) yields closed-form solutions for
the equilibrium prices p
k21
ðvkÞ=SðvkÞ and pkðvkÞ=SðvkÞ. (Recall that all solutions
are normalized by the numeraire SðvkÞ.) Plugging w(vk), pk21ðvkÞ, and pkðvkÞ into
equations (9)–(12) yields closed-form solutions for the remaining equilibrium
wages and prices, namely, p
k21
ðvkÞ, pkðvkÞ, wk21(vk), and wk(vk), all relative to
the numeraire S(vk).This content downloaded from 158.143.129.136 on October 24, 2018 02:07:43 AM
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Plugging p
k21
from equation (11-II) into equation (13) and rearranging yields
wk21ðvkÞ
SðvkÞ 5
H
L
Nk21 2 2
ðNk21 2 1Þ2
 : ð13‐IIÞ
For closed-form solutions to all of the equilibrium prices and wages in phase
II, proceed as follows. Plugging equation (13-II) into (11-II) yields a closed-form
solution for p
k21
ðvkÞ=SðvkÞ. The equation (140) expression for pk holds in phase
II, as does the equation (10) expression p
k
5 ðvk=uÞpk . Hence,
p
k
5 ðvk=uÞpk 5 ðvk=uÞ
"
HS
L
w
ðvk=uÞNk
#1=2
:
Plugging this into equation (15-II) and rearranging yields
wðvkÞ
SðvkÞ 5
H
L
a
ð11 aÞ2 ; where a ;
vk=u
N k
< 1 : ðF2Þ
Plugging equation (F2) into equation (140) yields a closed-form equilibrium so-
lution for pkðvkÞ=SðvkÞ. Plugging this and w/S from equation (F2) into (12) yields
a closed-form equilibrium solution for wkðvkÞ=SðvK Þ. Thus, we have provided
closed-form equilibrium solutions for all of the endogenous prices in phase II.
C. Proof of Lemma 1
Let vLk be the value of vk at which the developing country is about to produce a
type k good but has not yet started. At this point its wage wðvLk Þ is that of a typical
type (k 2 1) country, that is, wðvLk Þ 5 wk21, where wk21 is given in equation (7).
Equating the equation (7) expression for wk21 with the equation (F1) expression
for wðvLk Þ and solving for vLk yields
vLk 5
ðNk21 2 1ÞNk
N 2k21
u: ðF3Þ
Let vHk be the value of vk at which the developing country stops producing
goods of group (k2 1), that is, xk21ðvHk Þ 5 0. At vkp u, we are in a perfect-sorting
world with Nk21 and Nk replaced by N k21 2 1 and Nk1 1, respectively. See the dis-
cussion immediately preceding lemma 1. Thus, at vkp u the developing country
produces only group k goods and, specifically, does not produce group (k 2 1)
goods. Thus, there is some vHk that is strictly less than u at which the developing
country stops producing group (k 2 1) goods. Further, since at vk just above vLk
the developing country produces group (k 2 1) goods, vHk > v
L
k .D. Monotonicity of Wages in Phases I and II
Lemma 11. (1) wðvkÞ=SðvkÞ is increasing in vk for vk in the range vLk < vk < u.
(2) ½wðvkÞ=SðvkÞ=ðvk=uÞ is decreasing in vk for vk in the range vLk < vk < vHk .
Proof of part 1. Consider phase I, where vLk < vk < v
H
k . Differentiating equation
(F1) with respect to vk yieldsThis content downloaded from 158.143.129.136 on October 24, 2018 02:07:43 AM
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All∂wðvkÞ=SðvkÞ
∂vk
5 akðy1 2 ﬃﬃﬃﬃvkp Þð ﬃﬃﬃﬃvkp 2 y2Þ; ðF4Þ
where akðvkÞ > 0, and
y2 5
ﬃﬃﬃ
u
p
 
N 1=2k
N k21
½ðNk21 2 1Þ1=2 2 ð2Nk21 2 1Þ1=2 < 0; ðF5Þ
y1 5
ﬃﬃﬃ
u
p
 
N 1=2k
Nk21
½ðNk21 2 1Þ1=2 1 ð2Nk21 2 1Þ1=2 > 0: ðF6Þ
It is tedious but straightforward to show that the PSC (see fn. 14) implies
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
vHk
p
<
y1. See online appendix E.3 for a step-by-step derivation. Since y2 < 0, it must be
that y2 <
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
vLk
p
. Hence the interval ðy2;  y1Þ contains the interval ð ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃvLkp ; ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃvHkp Þ.
Hence, y2 <
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
vk
p
< y1 in phase I. Hence the right-hand side of equation (F4)
is positive and wðvkÞ=SðvkÞ is increasing in vk.
Next consider phase II, where vHk < vk < u. From equation (F2), wðvkÞ=SðvkÞ is
increasing in a and hence in vk.
Proof of part 2 (vLk < vk < v
H
k ). Dividing equation (F1) by vk/u yields
wðvkÞ=SðvkÞ
vk=u
5
H
L
"
ðNk21 2 1Þ1=2 1 N 1=2k =ðvk=uÞ1=2
Nk21ðvk=uÞ1=2 1 Nk=ðvk=uÞ1=2
#2
¼ H
L
"
ðNk21 2 1Þ1=2ðvk=uÞ1=2 1 N 1=2k
Nk21ðvk=uÞ1 Nk
#2
  :
Differentiating,
∂
wðvkÞ=SðvkÞ
vk=u
∂vk
5 2akðvkÞ
"
vk
u
1 2
 
N k
Nk21 2 1
!
1=2
 
vk
u
!
1=2
2
Nk
Nk21
#
for some akðvkÞ > 0.32 The term in brackets is quadratic in
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
vk=u
p
and its largest
root is
y 5 ½ð2Nk21 2 1Þ1=2=ðNk21Þ1=2 2 1ðNkÞ1=2=ðNk21 2 1Þ1=2:
It follows that the quadratic term is positive when
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
vk=u
p
> y. Using equation
(F3), it is easy to show that
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
vLk =u
p
≥ y if and only if N k21 ≥ 1. Hence the quadratic
is positive for vk > vLk and the derivative is negative for vk > v
L
k .32 The term
akðvkÞ ; ðH=LÞ1=2ðw=SÞ1=2ðvkÞ21Nk21ðNk21 2 1Þ1=2=ðNk21vk=u 1 NkÞ2 > 0:
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Part 1 (wk21=S increasing in vk): Equating the right-hand sides of equations (11)
and (130) yields
wk21ðvkÞ
SðvkÞ 5
 
H
L
1
Nk21 2 1
!1=2"
wðvkÞ
SðvkÞ
#1=2
2
1
Nk21 2 1
wðvkÞ
SðvkÞ : ðF7Þ
The right-hand side of equation (F7) is quadratic in
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
w=S
p
and thus increasing
in
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
w=S
p
for
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
w=S
p
≤
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
H=L
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Nk21 2 1
p
=2. It thus suffices to show that this last
inequality is satisfied in phase I. Since w/S is increasing in vk (lemma 11), it suf-
fices to show that the inequality holds at vk 5 vHk . Recall that v
H
k is the value of vk
at which the developing country stops producing goods of type (k 2 1), that is,
xk21ðvHk Þ 5 0. From equation (30),
xk21ðvHk Þ 5
1
p
k21
ðvHk Þ
"
12
wðvHk Þ
p
k21
ðvHk Þ
#
SðvHk Þ
so that xk21ðvHk Þ 5 0 implies pk21ðvHk Þ 5 wðvHk Þ. Plugging this into equation (130)
yields
wðvHk Þ
SðvHk Þ
5
H
L
1
Nk21 2 1
 :
Hence ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
wðvHk Þ=SðvHk Þ
q
≤
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
H=L
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Nk21 2 1
p
=2
implies  
H
L
1
Nk21 2 1
!1=2
≤
"
H
L
ðNk21 2 1Þ
#1=2,
2
or 4 ≤ ðNk21 2 1Þ2 or Nk21 ≥ 3. But N k ≥ 2 and Nk21 ≥ Nk 1 2 (the PSC) together
imply N k21 > 3. Thus, the inequality holds at vHk .
Part 1 (wk/S decreasing in vk): We start with a preliminary result. At vk 5 vLk the
developing country does not produce xk. Hence we are in the perfect sorting equi-
librium of proposition 2: wðvLk Þ 5 wk21ðvLk Þ, which, from equation (7), gives us
wðvLk Þ=SðvLk Þ 5
Nk21 2 1
N 2k21
H
L
:
Further, from equation (F3),
wðvLk Þ=SðvLk Þ
vLk =u
5
Nk21 2 1
N 2k21
H
L
 ðNk21 2 1ÞNk
N 2k21
5
1
Nk
H
L
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AllWe now turn to the core of the proof. Equating the right-hand sides of equa-
tions (12) and (140) yields
wkðvkÞ
SðvkÞ 5
"
H
L
1
Nk
wðvkÞ=SðvkÞ
vk=u
#1=2
2
1
Nk
wðvkÞ=SðvkÞ
vk=u
 :
This is just equation (F7) with Nk replacing Nk21 2 1 and ðw=SÞ=ðvk=uÞ replacing
w/S. Thus, wk/S is increasing in ðw=SÞ=ðvk=uÞ if
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃðw=SÞ=ðvk=uÞp ≤ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃðH=LÞNkp =2.
Since ðw=SÞ=ðvk=uÞ is decreasing in vk (part 2 of lemma 11), the inequality holds
throughout phase I if it holds at vk 5 vLk . But from equation (F8), this means
1
N k
H
L
≤
N k
4
H
L
or 4 ≤ N 2k , which always holds. Hence wk/S is increasing in ðw=SÞ=ðvk=uÞ. But
ðw=SÞ=ðvk=uÞ is decreasing in vk (part 2 of lemma 11). Hence wkðvkÞ=SðvkÞ is de-
creasing in vk.
Part 2: Dividing both sides of equation (F7) by wðvkÞ=SðvkÞ establishes that
wk21=w is decreasing in w/S and hence, by lemma 11, decreasing in vk.
F. Proof of Proposition 3
Part 1: From equation (30), xk21 5 ðS=pk21Þð12 w=pk21Þ. From equation (130),
p
k21
=S is increasing in w/S. Dividing equation (130) by w(vk),
p
k21
ðvkÞ
wðvkÞ 5
"
H
L
1
Nk21 2 1
SðvkÞ
wðvkÞ
#1=2
; ðF9Þ
which is decreasing in w/S. Hence xk21(vk) is decreasing in w/S and, by lemma 11,
decreasing in vk. By the definition of vHk , xk21ðvHk Þ 5 0 so that xk21ðvkÞ falls to zero.
By labor market clearing, Hxk21 1Hxk 5 L so that xk is increasing in vk. By the
definition of vLk , xkðvLk Þ 5 0 so that xk(vk) rises from zero.
Part 2: From equations (9) and (F9), p
k21
ðvkÞ=wðvkÞ is decreasing in w/S, and
hence, by lemma 11, p
k21
ðvkÞ=wðvkÞ is decreasing in vk.
From equation (140),
p
k
ðvkÞ
wðvkÞ 5
"
H
L
1
Nk
1
vk=u
1
wðvkÞ=SðvkÞ
#1=2
: ðF10Þ
From equation (10), p
k
5 ðvk=uÞpk . Hence
p
k
ðvkÞ
wðvkÞ 5
ðvk=uÞpkðvkÞ
wðvkÞ 5
 
H
L
1
N k
!1=2"
wðvkÞ=SðvkÞ
vk=u
#21=2
; ðF11Þ
which, by lemma 11, is increasing in vk.
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capabilities, wealth, and trade 873Part 4: Revenue for any firm i is Ri 5 pixi . Multiplying the expression for xi in
equation (30) by pi yields Ri=S 5 pixi=S 5 12 wi=pi . Hence, for a developing
country producing a type (k 2 1) good,
Rk21ðvkÞ
SðvkÞ 5 12
wðvkÞ
p
k21
ðvkÞ 5 12
"
L
H
ðNk21 2 1ÞwðvkÞ
SðvkÞ
#1=2
  ; ðF12Þ
where the second equality follows from equation (9) (p
k21
5 p
k21
) and the equa-
tion (130) expression for p
k21
ðvkÞ. For a developing country firm producing a
type k good,
RkðvkÞ
SðvkÞ 5 12
wðvkÞ
p
k
ðvkÞ 5 12
"
L
H
Nk
wðvkÞ=SðvkÞ
vk=u
#1=2
; ðF13Þ
where the second equality follows from equation (10) (p
k
5 ðvk=uÞpk) and the
equation (140) expression for p
k21
ðvkÞ.
GDP per capita of the developing country is given by y 5 ðHRk21 1HRkÞ=L
(see eq. [8]), so
yðvkÞ
SðvkÞ 5
H
L
"
Rk21ðvkÞ
SðvkÞ 1
RkðvkÞ
SðvkÞ
#
¼ 2H
L
2
 
H
L
!1=2 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Nk21 2 1
p
1
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Nk
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
vk=u
p
!"
wðvkÞ
SðvkÞ
#1=2
  :
Substituting into this the equation (F1) expression for wðvkÞ=SðvkÞ and simplify-
ing yields
yðvkÞ
SðvkÞ 5
H
L
1
H
L
⋅
12 2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Nk21 2 1
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Nk
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
u=vk
p
Nk21 1 Nkðu=vkÞ  :
Differentiating and simplifying yields
∂yðvkÞ=SðvkÞ
∂vk
5 a0kðvkÞ
"
vk
u
1
N 1=2k
ðNk21 2 1Þ1=2Nk21
 
vk
u
!1=2
2
N k
N k21
#
for some a0kðvkÞ > 0. The term in brackets is quadratic in ðvk=uÞ1=2 with roots
2½Nk=ðNk21 2 1Þ1=2 < 0 and ðvLk =uÞ1=2 > 0 (see eq. [F3]). Hence the term in
brackets is positive for vk > vLk and the derivative is positive for vk > v
L
k . This com-
pletes the proof of proposition 3.G. Proof of Proposition 5
Part 2 follows immediately from part 1 of lemma 11. Since equations (9) and
(140) hold in phase II, so do equations (F11) and (F13). Part 1 follows from equa-This content downloaded from 158.143.129.136 on October 24, 2018 02:07:43 AM
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Alltion (F11) and part 2 of lemma 11. For part 3, start by observing that RkðvkÞ=SðvkÞ
rises in vk, which follows from equation (F13) and part 2 of lemma 11. In phase II
all income comes from production of type k goods so that yðvkÞ=SðvkÞ 5
ðH=LÞRkðvkÞ=SðvkÞ, which is also rising in vk.
H. Proof of Lemma 2
Consumers spend a fraction d of income on each good. It follows that the value
of exports of a typical type k country is Xk 5 pkxk 2 dHpkxk , where Hpkxk is in-
come or GDP. Labor market equilibrium is L 5 Hxk . It follows that
X kðvkÞ
SðvkÞ 5 ð12 dH Þ
L
H
p
k
ðvkÞ
SðvkÞ ;
X k21ðvkÞ
SðvkÞ 5 ð12 dH Þ
L
H
p
k21
ðvkÞ
SðvkÞ ;
          ðF14Þ
where the right-hand equation follows from the left-hand equation by symmetry.
Turning to the developing country, consider phase II, where only group k
goods are produced and exported. By the logic of equation (F14), Xk=S 5 ð12
dH ÞðL=H Þðpk=SÞ, which is increasing in pk/S and hence, by parts 1 and 2 of prop-
osition 5, in vk. Further, Xk=Xk 5 ðXk=SÞ=ðXk=SÞ 5 pk=pk 5 vk=u, where the last
equality follows from equation (10). Hence Xk=X k is increasing in vk. Next con-
sider phase I, where both goods are produced. Let Rk21 ; pk21xk21 and Rk ; pkxk
be revenues so that income or GDP is H ðRk21 1 RkÞ. It follows that the values of
the developing country’s exports of group (k 2 1) and group k goods are given
by
X k21ðvkÞ 5 maxf0;Rk21ðvkÞ2 dH ½Rk21ðvkÞ1 RkðvkÞg
5 maxf0; ð12 dH ÞRk21ðvkÞ2 dHRkðvkÞg ;
X kðvkÞ ¼ maxf0; ð12 dH ÞRkðvkÞ2 dHRk21ðvkÞg:
ðF15Þ
(The max operator is needed because it is possible that one of the two goods is
imported.) Revenue for any firm i is Ri 5 pixi . Multiplying the expression for xi
in equation (30) by pi yields Ri 5 pixi 5 ð12 wi=piÞS . Hence for the developing
country producing group (k2 1) and group k goods, Rk21=S 5 ð12 w=pk21Þ and
Rk=S 5 ð12 w=pkÞ. From part 2 of proposition 3, a phase I rise in vk raises w/pk21
and lowers w/pk so that Rk21/S falls and Rk/S rises. Hence from equation (F15),
X k21ðvkÞ=SðvkÞ falls and X kðvkÞ=SðvkÞ rises in phase I.
Consider X k21=S . Equation (11) and proposition 4 imply that pk21=S is increas-
ing in vk in phase I. Hence from equation (F14), X k21=S is increasing in vk in
phase I, as required. But we have already seen that Xk21/S falls. Hence
X k21=X k21 falls. Finally, in phase I, Rk21/S is falling so that by equation (F15),
Xk/S is rising faster than ð12 dH Þpkxk=S . Compare this to X k=S 5 ð12
dH Þðp
k
=SÞðL=H Þ from equation (F14). By equation (10), pk/S is rising faster than
p
k
=S . Also, xk is rising faster than the constant L/H. Hence X k=X k is rising.This content downloaded from 158.143.129.136 on October 24, 2018 02:07:43 AM
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Trade Data
COMTRADE reports each bilateral transaction twice, once by the importer and
once by the exporter. We always use the importer’s data as they are known to be
more reliable for most countries.
The countries in our sample are (using International Organization for Stan-
dardization codes for brevity)33 AFG, AGO, ALB, ARG, AUS, AUT, BDI, BEN,
BFA, BGD, BGR, BOL, BRA, CAN, CHE, CHL, CHN, CMR, COL, CRI, CUB,
DEU, DNK, DOM, DZA, ECU, EGY, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR, GHA, GIN, GRC,
GTM, HND, HTI, HUN, IDN, IND, IRL, IRQ, ISR, ITA, JAM, JOR, JPN, KEN,
KHM, LBN, LKA, MAR, MDG, MEX, MLI, MMR, MOZ, MWI, MYS, NER,
NGA, NIC, NLD, NOR, NPL, NZL, PAK, PER, PHL, PNG, POL, PRT, PRY,
ROU, RWA, SAU, SDN, SEN, SGP, SLE, SLV, SOM, SWE, TCD, TGO, THA,
TUN, TUR, UGA, URY, USA, VEN, ZMB, and ZWE. The only major countries
not included in our list are Taiwan and Hong Kong. Taiwan is excluded because
there are no 1980 data. Hong Kong is excluded because, for our purposes, it
should be merged with China in 2005 and be by itself in 1980. None of our
2005 cross-section results are affected by the inclusion of Taiwan and Hong Kong
(the latter either by itself or merged with China).
We exclude live animals, meat, fish, and dairy. These goods account for only
2.1 percent of trade, and including them does not affect our results at all; how-
ever, it is hard to relate trade in these goods to the issues raised in this paper.
Price data pgk are from the US historical imports CD, 2001–5. This CD reports
only what is called the “first quantity” and “first value” so that all observations
within an HS10 product have the same quantity units. We sum US imports and
quantities by HS10 product and trading partner (exporter to the United States).
We calculate unit values with the summed data. In addition, we winsorize the unit
values below the 10th within-HS10 percentile and above the 90th within-HS10
percentile. Winsorizing makes virtually no difference to our results.
Table 1 in the text was constructed as follows. HS6 codes were ranked on the
basis of world exports. The top 10 codes were chosen. Only industrial products
were ranked; that is, we excluded animal and vegetable products, mineral prod-
ucts, precious stones, gold, and oil (two-digit HS codes 16–24, 28–70, and 72–
96). We then assigned an industry to each HS6 code. There are only seven indus-
tries because passenger cars includes three of the top 10 codes (870323, 870332,
870324, ranked 1, 5, and 6, respectively) and semiconductors includes two of
the top 10 codes (854231 and 854239, ranked 7 and 10). Export data are from
COMTRADE. Four-firm concentration ratios are authors’ calculations based on
data sources reported in table G1.33 See online app. table B1 for a full list of country names and GDPs per capita.
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Price Ranges
The theory predicts that, for a single good, all producers of the good will share
the same price-quality ratio. Since richer countries have higher quality, they
should have higher prices. That is, prices should be increasing in the income
of the exporter. Since price data are not available, we follow Schott (2004) in
proxying for prices using HS10 unit values from the 2005 US import file. We em-
phasize that unit values are extremely noisy so that caution must be exercised in
interpreting them as prices. See Appendix G for a discussion of the data.
Let pgk be the unit value of good g exported by country k to the United States.
We are interested in how the pgk vary as we move through product ranges. The
most familiar way of doing this is Schott’s (2004, table V) famous regression
ln p
gk
5 ag 1 b ln yk , where ag is an HS10 product fixed effect. Reestimating
Schott’s regression using 2005 US imports from our 94 exporters (187,363 obser-
vations), the ordinary least squares estimate of b is 0.29 (clustered tp 8.05) so
that, as in Schott, there is indeed a statistically significant positive correlation be-
tween unit values and exporter incomes.
A sharper prediction of our theory is as follows. Consider a single HS10 good
g. Recall that in the HS10 panel of figure 5 we plotted the income of the poor-
est and richest countries that had significant exports of g; that is, we plotted
ðln ymin;g ; ln ymax;g Þ. Since for each g we know the identity of the poorest and richest
countries, we know these countries’ unit values. We denote them in obvious fash-
ion by pmin,g and pmax,g. We expect that
Dg ; ln pmax;g 2 ln pmin;g > 0:
This inequality is sharp in that it is directly related to our product ranges, that is,
to the poorest (min) and richest (max) exporters that define the boundaries of
our product ranges. It is also an inequality that is unlikely to hold because we are
examining two specific unit values (pmax,g and pmin,g) even though we know that
such unit values are extremely noisy.TABLE G1
Data Sources for Table 1
Industry Year Source Units
Passenger cars 2012 Org. Internat. des Constructeurs
d’Automobiles (OICA)
Production units
Semiconductors 2010 Market Share Reporter 2012 Revenue
Pharmaceuticals 2011 MarketLine Industry Profile:
Global Pharmaceuticals
Market value
Laptops 2010 Market Share Reporter 2012 Shipments
Mobile phones 2010 Market Share Reporter 2012 Units shipped
Aircraft 2010 IBISWorld: Global Commercial
Aircraft Manufacturing 2011
Revenue
Auto parts 2010 IBISWorld: Global Auto Parts &
Accessories Manufacturing 2011
RevenueThis content
 use subject to Universit downloade
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capabilities, wealth, and trade 877The term Dg > 0 defines one inequality for each product range in the HS10
panel of figure 5. A nonparametric test of Dg > 0 is the sign test, which easily re-
jects the null hypothesis that the signs of the Dg are random (p -value of less than
.0001). The mean value of Dg is 0.63 (t p 27.23) and, more robustly with noisy
data, the median value of Dg is 0.45. Since e0.45 2 1 p 0.57, this implies that
the richest significant exporter of the median product has a unit value that is
57 percent higher than the corresponding unit value of the poorest significant
exporter. Cautiously interpreting unit values as prices, this means that prices
are increasing as one moves through a product range in figure 5.
It is tempting to examine an even stronger prediction, namely, that unit value
ranges Dg are large when product ranges ln ymax;g 2 ln ymin;g are large. While this is
not a prediction of the model, it can be generated by adding more restrictions
on how scarcity varies across countries and products. To examine this prediction
we estimate the following regression:
ln p
max;g
2 ln p
min;g
5 0:151 0:18ðln ymax;g 2 ln ymin;g Þ
(clustered tp 11.23). Thus, large product ranges in figure 5 are associated with
large unit value ranges.References
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